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The first chapter examines adolescent beauty as a potential originator of the ob-
served wage premium for adult beauty and finds that adolescent beauty has its own
separate effect on adult wages. Adolescent beauty also affects early human cap-
ital development, as evidenced by its significant impact on educational outcomes.
Changes in beauty over time are shown to be positively correlated with changes in
wages for full-time workers, and changes in beauty are generally not correlated with
appearance-related choice variables. I explore the possibility that self-confidence and
social capital are potential mechanisms through which adolescent attractiveness af-
fects future wages but find that these do not change the magnitude of the effects of
adolescent beauty, although they are of themselves significant determinants of wages.
The second chapter examines the effects of personal grooming behaviors on earn-
ings and shows evidence that these effects are due to persistent differences in prefer-
ences or productivity between workers displaying different grooming choices and not
statistical discrimination on the part of employers. In a longitudinal sample of lawyers
graduating from the same law school, men who wear glasses and men with facial hair
face an earnings penalty in first-year income and to some extent in subsequent years.
Some grooming behaviors are positively correlated with income in the 1970’s cohort
vi
and negatively correlated with income in the 1980’s cohort (and vice versa), suggest-
ing that fashion signals change relatively quickly. I also find that grooming behaviors
are correlated with beauty ratings and that the beauty premium is unaffected by
earnings, but the estimated effects of some grooming behaviors partially result from
their correlation with beauty. I do not find evidence that grooming behaviors act as
a signaling mechanism in the labor market.
The third chapter evaluates the claim that design piracy is beneficial to certain
status-goods firms. It builds on Pesendorfer’s model of fashion cycles by introducing
the possibility of design imitation for a market in which designs are used as a signaling
mechanism. There exist equilibria in which both the designer and imitator are active
in the market, but there are no conditions under which imitation is profitable to the
designer. Under some conditions the presence of a potential imitator will ensure that
the designer does not produce at all.
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Chapter 1
Child Stars vs. Ugly Ducklings: Does adolescent
attractiveness contribute to the beauty premium?
1.1 Introduction
Economists have found that physically attractive individuals earn more than their
average-looking or downright ugly counterparts [Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994], [Bid-
dle and Hamermesh, 1998], [Harper, 2000], [Hamermesh and Parker, 2004], [Averett
and Korenman, 1996]. This effect has been observed in various data and is persistent
after controlling for a multitude of other variables. I hope to gain insight into the
mechanism by which beauty provides an advantage in achievement and labor mar-
ket outcomes, particularly by investigating the significance of attractiveness as an
adolescent versus attractiveness as an adult. Physical beauty at a young age may
contribute to human capital investment during adolescence as good-looking children
and teenagers are given more attention by teachers and peers (and possibly even
parents [Langlois et al., 2000]), and thus are able to build more human capital as
2
they move through their formative years [Lennon, 1990], [Clifford and Walster, 1973].
Analyzing the effects of adolescent and adult beauty can tell us whether the beauty
premium observed in adulthood is simply the residual effect of greater investment
during childhood (assuming that those who were attractive in adolescence also tend
to be attractive as adults). Investigating the channels through which labor market
inequalities arise and knowing which life stages are most important in perpetuating
differences in outcomes between groups can lead to more effective policies.
While there is an extensive body of research showing the presence of an earnings
advantage for physically attractive adults, there has been no economics research ex-
amining the effects on earnings of being physically attractive early in life. However,
several papers in both economics and sociology have examined the effects of differ-
ent types of childhood experiences on adult outcomes. In examining how childhood
characteristics can lead to increased adult earnings, Persico et al. [2004] find that
the height wage premium results not from adult height, but from adolescent height.
In a similar way, physical attractiveness as a young adult may influence a person’s
social environment and human capital investment, leading to a beauty premium ob-
served later in life. Additional research by Mobius and Rosenblat [2006] suggests
that physical beauty may facilitate the development of desirable personality traits
such as confidence and cooperation, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the
salient characteristic is not beauty itself but rather the confidence and social abil-
ties developed as a result of being beautiful. If this is the case, we should expect
adolescent beauty to have an effect since presumably personality traits are developed
throughout a person’s life. Figure 1 demonstrates the avenues through which adult
3
and adolescent beauty may impact earnings.
Figure 1.1: Potential avenues of causation for the beauty premium
Adolescent
beauty
Adult
beauty
Higher
earnings
Human capital
investment
Discrimination,
higher pro-
ductivity
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the beauty premium springs
from adolescent or adult levels of attractiveness (or both), to identify possible channels
mediating the effects of beauty, and to investigate the relationship between beauty
and appearance-related choice variables. In order to do this, I use data from the
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) [Harris and Udry],
which contain interviewer ratings of physical attractiveness in four different waves of
the survey spanning both adolescence and adulthood. Additionally, the data contain
objective measures of grooming and appearance, such as whether the respondent
wears glasses or has ever had braces; I use these measures to show that grooming
behaviors do not significantly affect perceived physical attractiveness.
I find that variables measuring adolescent beauty are significantly correlated with
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adult wages even after controlling for measures of adult beauty, making it clear that
increased human capital investment and other experiences early in life are significant
drivers of the observed earnings differential for attractiveness. Attractiveness at an
early age affects human capital investment as measured by GPA and formal education
level; furthermore, I find that adolescent beauty has a much larger effect on young
men’s educational outcomes than young women’s educational outcomes. This paper
also analyzes the effects of grooming and appearance decisions in order to evaluate the
efficacy and profitability of appearance enhancements and to determine that grooming
behaviors are not a source of the observed wage premia for adolescent and adult
beauty. Other regressions include variables proxying for confidence and social skills,
but I do not find evidence that these play a role in the observed effects of either adult
or adolescent attractiveness.
The paper is set up as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data and the attractive-
ness variables used and makes the case that adolescent and adult beauty are distinct.
Section 1.3 explores both adolescent attractiveness and adult attractiveness as sta-
tistically significant determinants of adult earnings. Next, section 1.4 explains the
effects of adolescent beauty on educational outcomes, which are determinants of earn-
ings in addition to being relevant outcomes in their own right. Section 1.5 addresses
issues of measurement error by examining concurrent changes in beauty and earn-
ings, showing that changes in earnings are correlated with changes in attractiveness.
Finally, sections 1.6 and 1.7 focus on several mechanisms through which beauty may
lead to increased earnings, seeking evidence that early experiences enable attractive
teens to develop better grooming habits, self-confidence, or social skills.
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1.2 The Data
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health consists of four separate in-
home interviews of a nationally representative sample of participants who are in grades
7-12 when the study originates. It includes measures of various health outcomes and
risk factors as well as social, economic, psychological, and academic variables. The
Add Health data were collected beginning in 1994, with the first wave of the survey
being conducted primarily during the 1994 - 1995 school year. The second wave
follows up with respondents approximately one year later, during the summer of
1996. Wave III of the survey takes place in 2001 and 2002, and wave IV takes place
in 2007 and 2008. This paper uses the public-use portion of the Add Health data.
This analysis primarily focuses on data from waves I and IV for respondents who
are working full-time (at least 35 hours per week) when the final survey is adminis-
tered. Out of 5,109 wave IV respondents, 4625 are working full time; I exclude 555
outliers making less than $2.15 (the federally mandated minimum wage for restaurant
servers) and 139 making more than $100 per hour. This leaves 3,931 respondents in
the sample; due to instances of missing control variables, this figure drops to 3,909 for
the final group of full-time workers, which includes 1,966 women and 1,943 men whose
ages range from 24 to 33. For this group of workers, table 1.1 shows the sample means
of each of the variables used in the main regressions. The family and demographic
variables are collected during the initial wave of the survey, while the education and
adult demographic variables are collected concurrently with the wage data.
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The estimation strategy used is outlined in the equation below.
wit = β0 + β1ai,adolescent + β2ait + β3Dit + β4Eit + it (1.1)
where:
wit = i’s wage at time t
ai,adolescent = i’s adolescent attractiveness
ait = i’s attractiveness at time t
Dit = a vector of demographic control variables collected in wave I
Eit = a vector of educational control variables collected in wave IV
Using this basic setup, regressions in the following sections include a variety of control
variables listed in table 1.1, including those for demographics, family background,
educational acheivement, and family outcomes. Other variations of this specification
found in sections 1.6 and 1.7 include a vector of grooming variables, a measurement
of self-confidence, and several measures of social capital.
1.2.1 Measures of attractiveness
At the end of each instance of the survey, every respondent is rated by their sur-
vey administrator on a five-point scale of physical attractiveness. Since there are
four different waves of the survey, this means that each participant has up to four
attractiveness ratings over time, although in actuality only 51 percent of the orig-
7
inal respondents have data for all four time periods. The first two take place in
adolescence, while the second two take place in young adulthood. Since I want to dis-
tinguish between the effects of adolescent beauty and adult beauty, it is necessary to
establish that this characteristic does change over time and that there are observable
differences between these ratings in the different waves and that these differences
are larger for ratings that are separated by longer time periods. The instances of
the interviewer-rated physical attractiveness variables from the various waves of the
study are moderately correlated; unsurprisingly, these correlations are strongest for
the waves that are chronologically closer to one another (see table 1.2). The pairwise
correlations of these variables between wave IV and waves I and II are the lowest,
which is expected given that wave IV took place fourteen and twelve years after waves
I and II, respectively. Wave I and wave II are separated by only one or two years,
and these two waves have the highest correlations. For all four different interviewer
ratings of physical attractiveness, the average pairwise correlation is 0.19 and Cron-
bach’s α is 0.48, which indicates a mediocre level of intertemporal consistency in the
interviewer ratings. By way of comparison, Biddle and Hamermesh [1998] find aver-
age pairwise correlation of around 0.40 and Cronbach’s α equal to 0.75 for a sample
in which four different raters score the same photograph of each subject. This leads
to the conclusion that adolescent and adult attractiveness are correlated, but there is
enough variation to treat them as separate variables.
In order to maximize the number of observations available, most of the regressions
in this paper use only data from the first and fourth waves of the survey, which take
place when the respondents are 12 - 18 years old and 24 - 30 years old, respectively.
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The scale is composed of the following choices: “very unattractive,” “unattractive,”
“about average,” “attractive,” and “very attractive.” For the purposes of this anal-
ysis, the lowest two categories are combined into a single “below average” category
since together they constitute only 6 to 7 percent of the participants1; thus, four cat-
egories of attractiveness are created in both adolescence and adulthood. Throughout
this paper, the bulk of the analysis of the effects of attractiveness uses these cat-
egories, and their cross-tabulation in the two separate time periods can be seen in
table 1.3.
1.3 Results
The first major contribution of this paper is to establish that both adolescent at-
tractiveness and adult attractiveness are independently and significantly correlated
with adult earnings. Table 1.4 examines this relationship by reporting coefficients
when attractiveness measurements from the two time periods are included separately
as well as concurrently. In columns 1 - 3, no control variables are present, and the
“above average” and “very attractive” categories for adolescents and adults show sig-
nificant positive correlation with earnings. It would appear since the coefficients for
adult and adolescent attractiveness are relatively similar that perhaps these variables
are measuring the same thing; however, including variables from both time periods
together only slightly diminishes each coefficient. Adding demographic, educational,
and grooming controls decreases the coefficients of both adolescent and adult beauty,
1In wave I (IV), 2.1 (3.0) percent of respondents are in the “very unattractive” category, while
4.1 (4.0) are in the “unattractive” category.
9
but the adolescent and adult categories for “very attractive” remain significant when
examined alone and together. The coefficients of the “below average” categories are
generally negative but never significant, perhaps because this category is smaller or
contains more randomness relative to the others.
Columns 4 through 6 add demographic controls from the first wave of the survey
which mainly pertain to each participant’s upbringing and socioeconomic background;
they include race, age, parent income, whether the family ever received government
assistance, and mother’s education level. Adding these demographic controls reduces
the coefficients for the top two adolescent beauty categories by about one-third, sug-
gesting that family background has significant bearing on physical appearance in
high school. This is not surprising, especially when considering that good-looking
parents are likely to both make more money and have better-looking offspring than
average-looking parents. Another theory postulates that intelligent, wealthy men
tend to marry good-looking women, so that families with high socioeconomic status
are genetically more likely to have attractive, intelligent children [Kanazawa, 2011].
Columns 7 through 9 add controls from the fourth wave of the survey regarding
the respondents’ educational and family status. These include indicator variables for
whether the respondent is currently a full-time student, has graduated college, has
finished a graduate degree, is currently married, or has been convicted of a criminal
offense other than a minor traffic violation as well as a variable for the number of
children the respondent has. Adding these controls somewhat diminishes the cor-
relation of wages and attractiveness, showing a noticeably stronger impact on the
adolescent coefficients for men. This suggests that some of the premium on mens’
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adolescent attractiveness can be attributed the higher levels of education garnered
by more attractive young men. We should consider that attractiveness factors into
an individual’s educational and life decisions; attractive adolescents who expect a
monetary return to their looks may choose to pursue higher levels of education than
their peers who are less endowed with physical beauty, while less attractive adoles-
cents may expect a penalty for their looks and compensate by investing less effort in
human capital development (or choosing an alternate route such as a life of crime, as
explored by Mocan and Tekin [2010]); section 1.4 examines this more closely.
The magnitude of the beauty premium is generally the same for men and women
here. One difference is that adult men in the “very attractive” category earn a wage
premium that is approximately 6 percentage points higher than those in the “above
average” category, while women in the “very attractive” category earn a virtually
identical wage premium as those who are merely “above average.” For women, there
may be an upper threshold of attractiveness after which marginal improvements in
appearance do not generate returns in the form of increased wages; in fact, it has
been suggested that a so-called “bimbo effect” exists, in which beautiful women are
perceived as being less competent than their less-attractive peers [Hamermesh, 2011].
Alternately, extremely attractive women may find that their beauty generates higher
returns in the marriage market and concentrate their efforts there instead.
Table 1.5 explores the interactions between adolescent and adult beauty by creat-
ing indicator variables for nine different adolescent-adult beauty combinations. The
average and below average categories are combined, and the omitted category consists
of respondents who are in this group during both adolescence and adulthood. These
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results corroborate the results from the original specification; for example, adults who
are rated as “above average” do not have the same wage premium, but instead the
magnitude of this premium is dependent on their level of adolescent beauty as well.
An interesting exception is that women who are very attractive in both adolescence
and adulthood actually have an insignificant 7.2% higher wages, while those who were
average or above average in adolescence have wages that are about 20% higher than
the control group.
I also consider the return to attractiveness for a more broadly defined measure
of well-being by looking at household income rather than considering only the effect
on a person’s own wages, allowing for the fact that women may pursue returns to
attractiveness more aggressively in the marriage market than in the labor market,
at least in comparison to men. Table 1.8 shows the results of a regression on log
household income for the respondents who are working full-time for whom such data
were available, using a slightly smaller subsample of the group used in the original
regressions on wages. The variable for household income is a categorical variable with
twelve possible annual income ranges. Each respondent is assigned the household in-
come equal to the midpoint of the range, with the exception of the highest category,
$150,000 or more; all respondents selecting this option were assigned an income of
$225,000. This resolves the potential issue of outliers skewing the results, and assign-
ing the midpoint value of each income range allows household income to be treated
as a continuous variable.
Adolescent attractiveness has a much larger effect on household income as com-
pared to only the respondents’ own wage level, while the effect of adult attractiveness
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is not markedly different, which implies that adolescent beauty is strongly correlated
with partners’ earnings. Beautiful people receive remuneration for their own good
looks, but they also apparently pair with other beautiful or otherwise successful peo-
ple and enjoy the benefits of a spouse’s higher wages as well. This suggests that
women who are good-looking earlier in life may be less inclined to pursue returns to
beauty in the formal labor market but that they garner a similar overall pecuniary
benefit compared to good-looking men; considering household income as a whole
shows that the effects of attractiveness are largely similar for both genders.2
For both own wages and household income, the attractiveness effects seem largely
additive rather than replacing one another, implying that both adolescent and adult
appearance are important in determining labor market outcomes. Traditional esti-
mates of the beauty premium are similar to the estimated effect here of adult attrac-
tiveness alone, suggesting that the gains to adolescent attractiveness are supplemen-
tary to the gains for being an attractive adult. The results for men and women are
generally similar, although demographic variables have a larger impact on the effects
of beauty for women while educational variables have a larger impact on the effects
of adolescent beauty for men. After including all of the control variables, adolescent
beauty appears to have a relatively lower effect for women than men. In order to
2Here I assume that these effects are being driven by a partner’s wages and not by other living
circumstances leading to higher overall household income. The survey question asks for the cumu-
lative income of everyone who lives in the household and contributes to the household budget, so it
ostensibly could include the income of roommates, parents, or other relatives rather than exclusively
referring to spouses or romantic partners. About 12 percent of the sample currently lives with one
or both parents, and about 16 percent live with more than one other adult. Both of these living sit-
uations are correlated with higher household income; however, attractiveness is actually negatively
correlated with the probability of living with either parents or roommates, so these living situations
would cause the effect of attractiveness on household income to be understated. Furthermore, in-
cluding indicators for parents or roommates or restricting the sample to married people only does
not substantially change the results.
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determine why this is so, the section 1.4 examines the effect of adolescent attractive-
ness on educational outcomes. Discovering how these outcomes differ between men
and women should tell us whether the observed differences in the effects of adoles-
cent attractiveness are statistical anomaly or are the result of systematic differences
between the experiences of males and females.
1.4 Adolescent attractiveness and educational in-
vestment
Adolescent beauty may have a different effect on labor market outcomes of women
compared to men if girls make different choices based on their attractiveness than
boys do, and analyzing how the sexes differ in their responses to their own attrac-
tiveness level as adolescents has the potential to highlight the mechanisms by which
adolescent beauty has an effect on adult wages and the disparate incentives faced by
young women and young men prior to entering the workforce. In order to explore the
various pathways of adolescent choice, tables 1.6 and 1.7 examine the correlation of
attractiveness scores with different educational outcomes. In making educational de-
cisions, adolescents consider the expected future gain from incurring costs to become
educated. Since beauty has been shown to lead to higher returns in the workplace
and beautiful adolescents have a higher likelihood of becoming beautiful adults, we
can expect to see attractive adolescents investing more heavily in human capital, an-
ticipating that their educational investments will be more handsomely rewarded than
equal investments by their plain-looking peers.
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Table 1.6 shows the effects of attractiveness on educational attainment, and it
contains the coefficients of adolescent attractiveness from a regression using years of
education as the dependent variable. As expected, attractiveness has a significant re-
lationship to academic outcomes such that both the above average and very attractive
categories are correlated with obtaining more education. Both genders display a cor-
relation between adolescent attractiveness and educational outcomes, but the effect
for young men is almost three times that of young women. Young men who are rated
as “very attractive” obtain 0.72 more years of schooling than average, while young
women in this category obtain only 0.28 more years of schooling. This could indicate
a more prominent societal expectation for men to be the primary breadwinners, a
tendency for teachers to focus more attention on young men than young women, or a
greater expectation on the part of young men that their looks will be highly rewarded
in the job market.
In a further attempt to explore the differences in the effects of attractiveness
between genders, table 1.7 shows the estimated effects of adolescent beauty on cu-
mulative high school grade-point average measured on a four-point scale, which is
collected during wave III of the survey. The wave III questionnaire is available for
only about half of wave IV respondents, which is why GPA is not included as a control
variable in the original estimation; nonetheless, examining it here should give some
indication of the effect of adolescent attractiveness on high school achievement. Once
again, adolescent attractiveness has a higher correlation with academic achievement
for the males in the sample than for the females. On a four-point scale, boys who
are above average or very attractive have grade-point averages that are 0.20 and 0.26
15
points higher than those who are average-looking, while girls in those categories do
not have significantly higher grades; the statistically insignificant premia for above
average and very attractive girls are 0.07 and 0.05, meaning that the effect of beauty
on grades is two to four times larger for boys than for girls. Girls in the below-average
category do demonstrate significantly lower GPAs by about 0.15 grade points, while
boys in the below-average category actually have higher than average GPAs by about
0.11 grade points.
1.5 The correlation between changes in beauty and
changes in income
Although I have shown that there is insufficient correlation between adolescent and
adult measures of beauty to treat these as if they were measuring the same quality,
one may still be tempted to interpret the observed return on adolescent attractiveness
as simply a return on the unobserved portion of adult beauty. The wave IV attrac-
tiveness rating is an imperfect measure of each respondent’s beauty, and the rating
from adolescence contains added information regarding each respondent’s innate at-
tractiveness. Therefore, the correlation of adult wages with adolescent attractiveness
may simply be a representation of the measurement error inherent in the data rather
than an estimation of the effects of beauty at different time periods. In fact, beauty
may be a primarily static characteristic, and the observed variation across time may
be due to discrepancies between interviewers’ perceptions of beauty. In an attempt to
establish that changes in observed attractiveness are not entirely attributable to mea-
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surement error and interviewer subjectivity, this section examines wages and beauty
in both wave III and wave IV of the data. In the initial estimation (see equation 1.1),
wages in each time period are dependent on both childhood attractiveness, adult
attractiveness, and various demographic and educational variables.
The Add Health dataset contains earnings for two different points in time, in
wave III, which takes place about seven years after the initial survey, and again in
wave IV, which takes place about thirteen years after the initial survey. Although
the respondents are still in young adulthood and many of them are still involved in
post-secondary schooling during at least one of these time periods, 1,237 of them
are working full-time (at least 35 hours per week) and making an hourly wage of
$2.15 to $100 during both of the latest surveys. Estimating the difference between
wages in these two periods allows for an investigation of the effects of a change in
attractiveness over the same time period. This approach temporarily ignores the effect
of adolescent attractiveness since this is a fixed characteristic once the respondent has
reached adulthood, but it has the potential to show that changes in attractiveness
are real and are relevant to earnings. It also has the added benefit of eliminating
individual fixed effects and any time-invariant personality traits that may be driving
the observed effects of beauty. The estimation equation then becomes:
∆wit = β2∆ait + β3∆Xi + ∆i (1.2)
Suppose that individual attractiveness does not actually change over time and
that variations within an individual’s measured attractiveness ratings are a result of
imperfect interviewer ratings. Then ait = ai+αit, where ai is the actual attractiveness
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and αit is an error term with mean zero. Assuming that αi,3 and αi,4 are independent
(and therefore E [∆ait] = E [αi,4 − αi,3] = 0), first-differencing the wage data from
the two adult time periods of the survey would then eliminate any observed effects of
beauty.
Table 1.9 shows the results of this regression. It includes variables measuring
changes in education, indicating whether a person completed high school, college, or
graduate school between waves III and IV, and variables measuring changes in marital
status, indicating whether a marriage or divorce took place between the two periods.
Additionally, I include indicator variables for each initial grade cohort to account
for the possibility that changes in beauty and wages are not linear in age (i.e., the
change in beauty from age 18 to 24 may be categorically different than the change
in beauty from age 24 to 30). The change in physical attractiveness is calculated by
converting the beauty ratings into their percentile counterparts and subtracting these
percentiles between wave III and wave IV. This accounts for the fact that the changes
from one point to another on the beauty scale are not necessarily linear, but instead
differ based on the starting and ending point. For the women, each percentile gain in
attractiveness leads to an increase of 0.2 percent in the ratio of wave IV wages to wave
III wages, meaning that going from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile would
yield an average wage increase of 10 percent. For the men, the result is negligible
but positive; the same increase in attractiveness is correlated with an average wage
increase of 1.5 percent. These results show that there is a positive correlation between
increases in beauty and earnings, leading to the conclusion that differences between
the attractiveness ratings are not random errors but instead represent real changes
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in beauty over time.
1.6 Endogeneity of beauty and the role of groom-
ing
Unlike other physical characteristics such as race or height, beauty is perceived as
being somewhat pliable. Some research provides support for the hypothesis that
individuals who invest in non-cognitive human capital in the form of social skills
and grooming are rated as being more physically attractive, raising the concern that
the beauty premium is partially demonstrating returns for grooming decisions and
personality characteristics rather than physical appearance alone. Several psychol-
ogy studies show that changing personal grooming choices such as clothing [Lennon,
1990] [Brase and Richmond, 2004], makeup [Etcoff et al., 2011], facial hair [Dixson and
Vasey, 2012] [Reed and Blunk, 1990] [Neave and Shields, 2008], or glasses [Bartolini
et al., 1988] in turn changes perceptions of subjects’ attractiveness and personality
traits. Hamermesh et al. [2002] find that grooming expenditures are positively cor-
related with womens’ beauty ratings, but that the increased spending on grooming
does not pay for itself in the form of higher earnings. Additionally, the existence of a
multi-billion dollar beauty industry suggests that there is not only a widespread belief
that physical appearance is an important characteristic, but also that it is possible
to affect one’s perceived level of beauty (or at least to maximize it subject to genetic
constraints).
Investigating the degree to which investments in beauty are effectual is of par-
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ticular importance to interpreting the results of this paper if one believes that the
observed return to attractiveness might be measuring an endogenous characteristic.
French et al. [2009] and Robins et al. [2011] suggest that the observed effects of
adolescent and adult attractiveness are actually a result of respondents’ personality
attractiveness and level of personal grooming, which both could be interpreted as
choice variables or changeable elements of human capital. There is, however, con-
vincing evidence that perception of these traits is confounded with perception of
an individual’s physical appearance. Several papers indicate that the perception of
beauty and other cognitive and non-cognitive skills are somewhat commingled in the
sense that physical attractiveness affects the perception of an individual’s ability level
and personality. For instance, Tews et al. [2009] find that in the absence of personality
information, hiring managers mistakenly ascribe more desirable personality charac-
teristics to physically attractive candidates, resulting in statistical discrimination on
the basis of physical appearance. Hope and Mindell [1994] find that an attractive
person is judged as being more socially competent when performing the same be-
havior as an unattractive person, indicating that measures of social skills are likely
confounded by physical attractiveness.
This potential overlap in perception of beauty, grooming, and personality traits
is potentially problematic in terms of establishing causality; if beauty is exogenous,
it is a plausible determinant of earnings, but if it is endogenous, then its connection
to earnings could be a coincidental byproduct of other decisions and characteristics.
Thus, I examine the relationship between beauty and grooming in order to determine
whether the beauty premium is primarily a result of innate beauty or of appearance
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enhancements. The first step in determining the extent to which beauty is mal-
leable is to examine the relationship between perceived attractiveness and measurable
grooming decisions. The data contain several of these measures, and examining their
relationship to attractiveness ratings demonstrates the impact of grooming on the
perception of beauty. Table 1.11 shows the sample means of respondents’ physical at-
tractiveness based on several different variables related to grooming and appearance.
In the adult surveys, participants are asked about corrective eyewear and whether
they wear glasses or contact lenses. In the adolescent surveys, participants are asked
whether they have a tattoo, pierced ears, any other piercing, or braces. The survey
data also include height and weight for each respondent at each wave of the survey,
which allows investigation into how body mass index (BMI) affects attractiveness. To
the extent that weight is a choice variable, this provides insight into another channel
through which individuals can affect their own level of perceived beauty.
Table 1.11 demonstrates a statistically significant difference in the average attrac-
tiveness levels associated with several of the grooming categories; however, this alone
is not enough to establish that grooming causes differences in perceived attractive-
ness. It is possible that people of different attractiveness levels are categorically more
or less likely to choose certain grooming behaviors over others because of different
income levels, social groups, or desires to conform to social norms. In order to deter-
mine whether grooming variables are predictive of attractiveness after controlling for
other factors, table 1.12 presents an ordered probit regression of grooming behaviors
on beauty, showing how grooming categories and adolescent attractiveness are corre-
lated with adult attractiveness. With a few exceptions, grooming categories are not
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significant predictors of attractiveness scores. Body mass index has a negative effect
on attractiveness for both genders, although the effect is stronger for women. Each
extra point on the body mass index scale is associated with a lower probability of
being in a higher beauty category. Women with tattoos are generally less attractive,
but the effect is not significant after accounting for demographic and educational con-
trols, suggesting that tattoos do not actually change the perception of beauty but are
instead a behavior associated with a certain group. For both genders, wearing glasses
for vision correction is negatively associated with the probability of being in higher
physical attractiveness categories; this is contrast to the insignificant effect of wearing
contact lenses. These overall results do not support the idea that early investments
in beauty are a significant determinant of adult beauty. With the possible exception
of eyeglasses, it appears that of the measurable appearance-related variables in this
dataset, the only effective channel for concurrently influencing one’s attractiveness is
through changes in body weight. Of course, there is a large spectrum of beauty and
grooming investments that are not included in this dataset, some of which may also
be effective routes to changing personal attractiveness.
Table 1.13 shows the effects of these other appearance-related variables on wages,
with and without attractiveness. Grooming investments have some efficacy, although
many of them do not appear to influence wages. Including these variables has only a
modest impact on the attractiveness coefficients, showing a slightly higher impact on
the effects of female attractiveness. This is probably due to the fact that BMI acts
as a crude proxy for physical attractiveness, and it affects female beauty more than
male beauty. The fact that including these other measures of appearance does little
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to diminish the magnitude of the coefficients on adolescent and adult attractiveness
implies that the return to beauty is unaffected by individuals’ grooming habits; these
habits may be correlated with earnings, but including them in the regression equation
does not significantly impact the relationship between attractiveness and earnings.
Interestingly, men and women who received orthodontic treatment in adolescence
earn an average of 6 to 7 percent more per hour than their counterparts, even after
controlling for factors such as education level and parent income. To the extent that
additional members of the sample set have potentially had their teeth straightened
later in life, this figure underreports the value of having a well-ordered smile. Men
who report having tattoos in high school have expected hourly earnings that are 11
percent lower than those of their peers. These effects are almost certainly at least
partially due to unobservable factors; to the extent that they are measuring reactions
to appearance, the effects are understated since any tattoos or braces received after
wave II of the survey are unreported. In 2007, 36 percent of 18-25 year-olds and 40
percent of 26-40 year-olds reported having a tattoo [Kohut et al., 2007], compared
to only 7 percent of the Add Health respondents, meaning that approximately an
additional 30 percent of the respondents became tattooed in the thirteen-year period
between the reporting of tattoos and the reporting of wages. Although subject to some
degree of endogeneity, these findings affirm that early investments in appearance are
somewhat influential in determining earnings but that they are not a contributing
factor to the effect of either adolescent or adult beauty on earnings.
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1.7 The role of confidence and social capital
One of the possible mechanisms through which adolescent beauty affects adult earn-
ings is through the accumulation of positive personality traits during childhood and
young adulthood. Children and young adults may have different social experiences
based on their level of physical beauty, causing them to possess different characteris-
tics later in life based on these formative experiences. This section utilizes elements
of the Add Health data that provide measurements of social capital and self-rated
attractiveness in an effort to determine whether these traits are a driving force of the
observed premium for adolescent beauty.
If attractive people tend to be more confident and confident people tend to earn
more, this is a potential avenue by which beautiful people have an advantage in the
workforce. It could be the case that attractive people feel and act differently from
unattractive people in a way that leads to different earning levels, so I use self-rated
and interviewer-rated attractiveness as proxies for the internal experience and the
external observation of attractiveness. In a section of the survey entitled “Social
Psychology and Mental Health,” participants are posed the question “How attractive
are you?” There are four possible responses, ranging from “not at all attractive” to
“very attractive.” Table 1.14 shows the tabulation between self-rated attractiveness
and interviewer-rated physical attractiveness in wave IV of the survey, and table 1.15
shows the interviewer-rated adolescent and adult beauty means for each level of adult
self-rated attractiveness. There is some degree of concordance between self-rated and
interviewer-rated attractiveness, although women choosing the highest category of
self-rated attractiveness are actually statistically less attractive than average in both
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adolescence and adulthood.
To assess the effect of confidence on earnings, table 1.16 shows the estimated
results of attractiveness and self-rated attractiveness on wages, using “moderately
attractive” as the omitted group for the self-rated variables. If part of the beauty pre-
mium is due to feeling of attractive rather than actually being attractive, then adding
self-rated attractiveness should reduce the effect of interviewer-rated attractiveness.
It turns out that including measures of self-rated attractiveness has virtually no effect
on the magnitude of either adolescent or adult attractiveness, although women who
rate themselves as “slightly attractive” and “not at all attractive” earn an average of
6.3 percent and 32.4 percent less than average, respectively. The coefficients on men’s
self-ratings have the expected signs but are not statistically significant. The conclu-
sion is that the beauty premium does not operate primarily through self-confidence,
at least not in the form of self-perception of attractiveness, but that self-confidence
is a salient determinant of wages.
Another way to evaluate the potential human capital advantages of adolescent
attractiveness is to use measurements of social capital. The data include several
social capital variables from adolescence and one measure of social capital during
adulthood. A social network is created for each school sampled, which allows the
calculation of each individual’s centrality, network density, and in-degree (the number
of friend nominations received) in high school. In adulthood, respondents are simply
asked how many close friends they have with whom they feel at ease, can talk to
about private matters, and can call on for help. If the positive effect of adolescent
beauty operates partially through creating a more accommodating social environment
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during the formative years, then including variables directly measuring social capital
should lessen the observed impact of adolescent attractiveness.
Table 1.17 shows the estimation results of regressing log wages on both attractive-
ness and social capital. This table shows results for a smaller number of respondents
than the initial wage regression since the adolescent social network variables are only
available for part of the sample, and the coefficients on the attractiveness variables are
slightly smaller for this subsample, which is something to keep in mind when inter-
preting the results and comparing to the original wage regressions. In table 1.17, the
results of the social capital regressions show that the inclusion of measures of social
capital has very little impact on the effect of either adolescent or adult attractiveness
on wages, which does not lend support to the idea that early socialization is a mecha-
nism through which the beauty premium operates. Social capital does, however, have
an independent positive effect on wages. Each additional close friendship reported in
adulthood is correlated with a 1.7 percent increase in hourly earnings. This result
is in concordance with several papers that have documented the positive effects of
social capital on labor market outcomes [Granovetter, 1973], [Mouw, 2003]. Measures
of social capital during secondary school are generally positive but are not significant
after including the demographic and educational control variables, indicating that any
positive effect of high school friendships occurs through other channels such as lower
attrition rates or higher achievement levels for students who are well-connected. This
is in slight contrast to a working paper that finds that adolescent social standing pre-
dicts large and persistent earnings differences throughout life [Galeotti and Mueller,
2005]. For the Add Health sample, attractiveness is positively correlated with some
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of the adolescent social capital variables, but it does not appear that the relationship
between the two is a driving force behind the beauty premium.
1.8 Conclusion
Adolescent beauty is positively and significantly correlated with adult earnings, and
this effect is in addition to the premium for adult beauty. This implies that physical
attractiveness has a cumulative effect over time and that the beauty premium as
traditionally estimated is augmented by the effects of adolescent appearance. After
controlling for other factors, individuals who are in the top two categories of beauty
during adolescence have wages that are 4 to 9 percent higher than those of average
attractiveness.
One observable way in which adolescent attractiveness affects adult earnings is
through its influence on other variables related to job market outcomes. I show that
young men in the top two categories of physical attractiveness generally earn bet-
ter grades and obtain higher levels of education than those who are average-looking,
while young women who are less attractive than average tend to earn worse grades
than those of average appearance; adolescent attractiveness has no significant cor-
relation with educational attainment for young women. These correlations provide
evidence that young people have rational expectations of encountering beauty-related
discrimination in the job market and that young men and young women have differ-
ent responses to the resulting incentives. When household income replaces individual
wages as the dependent variable, the coefficients on adolescent beauty categories are
larger and more significant, suggesting that adolescent attractiveness plays an impor-
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tant role in assortative matching.
Although differences in the effects of adolescent and adult attractiveness demon-
strate that they are distinct, I further rule out the possibility that the estimated
effects of adolescent beauty are due to measurement error by showing that changes
in beauty and changes in income covary in a nonrandom way. A first-differences es-
timation on wages shows that a two-point or larger increase in beauty is significantly
correlated with increased hourly earnings, while a two-point or larger decrease in
beauty is negatively (but not significantly) correlated with hourly earnings. This has
the added benefit of eliminating individual fixed effects, showing that the correlation
of beauty and wages is not simply a byproduct of the effects of personality traits or
other unobservable factors. This does raise the possibility that increased beauty is in
fact a consequence of increased earnings, but I address this concern by examining the
association between personal grooming choices and attractiveness. There is strong
evidence that body mass index is correlated with beauty, but no other appearance-
related choice variables are convincing determinants of physical attractiveness; addi-
tionally, including these appearance-related variables in log wage regressions does not
diminish the impact of either adolescent or adult beauty, although young men with
tattoos have lower earnings in adulthood, while young men and young women with
braces have higher earnings in adulthood.
Since adolescent beauty is shown to be a significant determinant of adult wages
through both direct correlation and through its influence on educational and rela-
tionship outcomes, I investigate whether these effects occur through the channels of
increased self-confidence and social skills developed by attractive young people. I
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find that self-rated attractiveness is somewhat correlated with earnings but that it
does not temper the effects of interviewer-rated adolescent attractiveness. Likewise,
some measures of social capital are also correlated with earnings, but these measures
do not appear to mediate the observed advantages of attractiveness. The premium
for adolescent beauty remains robust amidst the consideration of other sources of
this premium including adult beauty, grooming and appearance enhancements, self-
confidence, and interpersonal skills.
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Table 1.1: Sample means of independent and dependent variables
Full sample Female Male
Hourly wage 16.865 15.437 18.102
(10.277) (9.268) (11.047)
Adult attractiveness 3.464 3.514 3.413
(0.839) (0.8889) (0.781)
Adolescent attractiveness 3.591 3.690 3.491
(0.867) (0.914) (0.806)
Demographic controls Di
Age 28.889 28.737 29.043
(1.776) (1.762) (1.778)
White 0.692 0.663 0.722
(0.462) (0.473) (0.448)
Black 0.233 0.261 0.204
(0.423) (0.440) (0.403)
Asian 0.036 0.037 0.036
(0.187) (0.188) (0.186)
Mother high school grad 0.806 0.812 0.799
(0.396) (0.391) (0.401)
Mother college grad 0.416 0.418 0.415
(0.493) (0.493) (0.493)
Received government aid 0.236 0.241 0.231
(0.424) (0.428) (0.421)
Family income < $20,000 0.133 0.129 0.137
(0.340) (0.336) (0.344)
Family income $20,000 - $40,000 0.219 0.204 0.234
(0.414) (0.403) (0.423)
Family income $40,000 - $60,000 0.203 0.200 0.205
(0.402) (0.400) (0.404)
Family income $60,000 - $125,000 0.194 0.195 0.194
(0.396) (0.397) (0.395)
Family income > $125,000 0.024 0.028 0.020
(0.153) (0.165) (0.140)
Missing family income 0.227 0.243 0.211
(0.419) (0.429) (0.408)
Educational controls Ei
College grad 0.355 0.420 0.289
(0.479) (0.494) (0.454)
Graduate degree 0.090 0.121 0.059
(0.287) (0.326) (0.236)
Currently student 0.142 0.174 0.110
(0.349) (0.379) (0.313)
Married 0.497 0.518 0.477
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Number of children 0.862 0.954 0.769
(1.102) (1.127) (1.069)
Convicted criminal 0.125 0.049 0.202
(0.331) (0.216) (0.402)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Pairwise correlations of interviewer ratings of physical attractiveness across
waves
Physical Attractiveness
Wave I Wave II Wave III Wave IV
Wave I 1.000
Wave II 0.302 1.000
Wave III 0.183 0.213 1.000
Wave IV 0.130 0.132 0.160 1.000
All correlations are significant at the 1% level
Table 1.3: Wave I and wave IV attractiveness ratings
Female
Wave IV interviewer rating: Below average About average Attractive Very attractive Total
Wave I interviewer rating:
Below average 14 61 32 13 120
About average 49 361 235 58 703
Attractive 57 281 315 104 757
Very attractive 23 133 165 65 386
Total 143 836 747 240 1,966
Male
Wave IV interviewer rating: Below average About average Attractive Very attractive Total
Wave I interviewer rating:
Below average 20 64 34 3 121
About average 57 507 307 53 924
Attractive 37 331 266 57 691
Very attractive 17 73 90 27 207
Total 131 975 697 140 1,943
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Table 1.4: Regression estimates for the effects of adolescent and adult physical at-
tractiveness categories on (log) adult earnings
Controls: None Demographic Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Sample (N = 3909):
Adolescent below average −0.026 −0.020 −0.011 −0.006 −0.029 −0.024
(0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)
Adolescent above average 0.111∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Adolescent very attractive 0.179∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Adult below average 0.016 0.012 0.020 0.017 0.004 0.002
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
Adult above average 0.128∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Adult very attractive 0.183∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Female (N = 1966):
Adolescent below average −0.036 −0.036 −0.031 −0.031 −0.064 −0.062
(0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055)
Adolescent above average 0.108∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Adolescent very attractive 0.157∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036)
Adult below average 0.086 0.082 0.085 0.081 0.055 0.052
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050)
Adult above average 0.156∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Adult very attractive 0.212∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041)
Male (N = 1943):
Adolescent below average −0.018 −0.003 −0.011 0.003 −0.012 0.000
(0.057) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
Adolescent above average 0.113∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.047∗ 0.042
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Adolescent very attractive 0.213∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Adult below average −0.056 −0.061 −0.052 −0.056 −0.044 −0.048
(0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051)
Adult above average 0.101∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Adult very attractive 0.152∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050)
Coefficients denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.5: Regression estimates for the effects and interactions of adolescent and
adult attractiveness on (log) adult earnings using indicator variables
Adolescent Adult Full Sample Female Male
((N = 3909)) (N = 1966) (N = 1943)
Average Above 0.074∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.028) (0.042) (0.037)
Average Very 0.146∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.052) (0.070) (0.077)
Above Average 0.049∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.059) (0.039) (0.036)
Above Above 0.119∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.040) (0.041)
Above Very 0.158∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.139∗
(0.047) (0.060) (0.076)
Very Average 0.097∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.039) (0.051) (0.062)
Very Above 0.200∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.050) (0.062)
Very Very 0.113∗ 0.072 0.319∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.073) (0.108)
Regressions include Di and Ei vectors of control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.
Table 1.6: OLS regression estimates for the effects of adolescent attractiveness on
years of education
Full Sample : Female Male
(N = 5076) (N = 2743) (N = 2333)
Adolescent below average −0.023 0.002 −0.012
(0.118) (0.160) (0.174)
Adolescent above average 0.295∗∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.441∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.088) (0.092)
Adolescent very attractive 0.446∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.107) (0.139)
Regressions include Di vector of control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: OLS regression estimates for the effects of adolescent attractiveness on
high school GPA
Full Sample Female Male
(N = 3401) (N = 1878) (N = 1523)
Adolescent below average −0.034 −0.152∗∗ 0.113
(0.052) (0.067) (0.083)
Adolescent above average 0.134∗∗∗ 0.070∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.038) (0.043)
Adolescent very attractive 0.136∗∗∗ 0.050 0.262∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.046) (0.066)
Regressions include Di vector of control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Regression estimates for the effects of adolescent and adult attractiveness
on (log) household income
Controls: None Demographic Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Sample (N = 3741):
Adolescent below average 0.019 0.024 0.038 0.042 0.014 0.019
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046)
Adolescent above average 0.178∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Adolescent very attractive 0.249∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.032) (0.033)
Adult below average 0.010 0.001 0.016 0.007 −0.003 −0.009
(0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Adult above average 0.131∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Adult very attractive 0.225∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)
Female (N = 1883):
Adolescent below average 0.041 0.040 0.075 0.074 0.023 0.024
(0.075) (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.066)
Adolescent above average 0.214∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Adolescent very attractive 0.259∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) (0.042) (0.043)
Adult below average 0.066 0.053 0.086 0.076 0.043 0.035
(0.069) (0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.061) (0.061)
Adult above average 0.162∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
Adult very attractive 0.247∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.081∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050)
Male (N = 1858):
Adolescent below average 0.000 0.015 0.020 0.033 0.020 0.033
(0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065)
Adolescent above average 0.143∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Adolescent very attractive 0.251∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Adult below average −0.047 −0.055 −0.045 −0.052 −0.047 −0.055
(0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Adult above average 0.101∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.056∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Adult very attractive 0.203∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.061)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.9: First difference regression of percentile change in attractiveness on change
in log wages from wave III to wave IV
Full Sample (N = 1237): Female (N = 535): Male (N = 702):
∆ beauty 0.001 0.002∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ HS −0.007 −0.125 0.027
(0.071) (0.122) (0.089)
∆ college 0.267∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.101) (0.105)
∆ grad 0.507∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.112) (0.173)
Married 0.094∗∗ 0.069 0.099∗
(0.039) (0.061) (0.052)
Divorced −0.111∗ −0.072 −0.150∗∗
(0.062) (0.104) (0.076)
Coefficients denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 1.10: Sample means of grooming variables
Full sample Female Male
Adolescent BMI 22.555 22.370 22.734
(4.411) (4.522) 4.294)
Adult BMI 28.244 28.210 28.277
(6.631) (7.334) (5.869)
Glasses 0.215 0.236 0.194
(0.411) (0.425) (0.396)
Contact lenses 0.066 0.067 0.065
(0.248) (0.250) (0.247)
Pierced ear(s) 0.441 0.709 0.180
(0.497) (0.454) (0.384)
Other piercing 0.026 0.041 0.010
(0.158) (0.198) (0.102)
Braces 0.281 0.319 0.245
(0.450) (0.466) (0.430)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.11: Physical attractiveness means by various appearance-related variables
Female Male
Adolescent Adult Adolescent Adult
Overweight 3.736 3.523∗∗∗ 3.510 3.547 3.493 3.532 3.357 3.529∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.054) (0.028) (0.039) (0.020) (0.043) (0.022) (0.030)
Obese 3.752 3.121∗∗∗ 3.633 3.293∗∗∗ 3.523 3.160∗∗∗ 3.491 3.276∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.074) (0.027) (0.030) (0.019) (0.068) (0.022) (0.028)
Glasses 3.722 3.659∗ 3.545 3.439∗∗ 3.525 3.395∗∗∗ 3.439 3.357∗∗
(0.024) (0.045) (0.024) (0.041) (0.021) (0.040) (0.020) (0.037)
Contacts 3.702 3.782 3.523 3.484 3.500 3.492 3.421 3.460
(0.022) (0.078) (0.021) (0.092) (0.019) (0.074) (0.018) (0.071)
Tattoo 3.708 3.696 3.529 3.373∗∗ 3.512 3.340∗∗∗ 3.421 3.454
(0.022) (0.094) (0.021) (0.084) (0.019) (0.067) (0.019) (0.058)
Pierced ears 3.633 3.738∗∗ 3.501 3.528 3.519 3.414∗∗∗ 3.423 3.423
(0.040) (0.025) (0.037) (0.025) (0.021) (0.041) (0.020) (0.042)
Other piercing 3.699 3.908∗∗ 3.523 3.461 3.500 3.500 3.423 3.450
(0.022) (0.114) (0.021) (0.094) (0.018) (0.154) (0.018) (0.153)
Braces 3.690 3.744 3.510 3.542 3.486 3.542∗ 3.407 3.474∗∗
(0.025) (0.038) (0.025) (0.038) (0.019) (0.064) (0.021) (0.038)
Figures denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ are significantly different from the mean of the control group at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.12: Ordered probit estimates for the effects of grooming behaviors and ado-
lescent attractiveness on adult attractiveness
Full Sample Female Male
(N = 3756) (N = 1851) (N = 1905)
Adolescent below average −0.171∗∗ −0.040 −0.302∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.114) (0.111)
Adolescent above average 0.154∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.041) (0.060) (0.057)
Adolescent very attractive 0.239∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.073) (0.086)
Wave I BMI 0.004 0.008 −0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Wave IV BMI −0.030∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Braces −0.017 −0.076 0.050
(0.043) (0.059) (0.062)
Pierced ears 0.042 0.071 0.022
(0.044) (0.062) (0.069)
Tattoo −0.023 −0.171 0.084
(0.076) (0.115) (0.102)
Other piercing −0.065 −0.086 −0.180
(0.115) (0.130) (0.215)
Glasses −0.118∗∗∗ −0.115∗ −0.116∗
(0.046) (0.065) (0.067)
Contact lenses −0.046 −0.082 −0.003
(0.074) (0.105) (0.106)
Regressions include Di and Ei vectors of control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.13: Regression estimates for the effects of adolescent and adult attractiveness
and grooming behaviors on (log) adult earnings
Full Sample Female Male
(N = 3756) (N = 1851) (N = 1905)
Adolescent below 0.010 0.017 −0.025 −0.017 0.026 0.030
(0.040) (0.040) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
Adolescent above 0.048∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.044 0.050∗ 0.040
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Adolescent very 0.087∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043)
Adult below 0.021 0.016 0.070 0.063 −0.029 −0.041
(0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052)
Adult above 0.074∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.014) (0.028) (0.028)
Adult very 0.085∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.070∗ 0.051 0.117∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) (0.050) (0.050)
Wave I BMI −0.010∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Wave IV BMI 0.004∗∗ −0.001 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Braces 0.064∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.021) (0.029) (0.031)
Pierced ears −0.029 0.009 −0.054
(0.022) (0.031) (0.034)
Tattoo −0.084∗∗ −0.036 −0.109∗∗
(0.038) (0.057) (0.050)
Other piercing 0.051 0.069 0.016
(0.058) (0.065) (0.124)
Glasses −0.036∗ −0.027 −0.054∗
(0.022) (0.030) (0.032)
Contact lenses −0.001 0.005 0.011
(0.036) (0.051) (0.051)
Regressions include Di and Ei vectors of control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients denoted
by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.14: Interviewer and self-ratings of attractiveness
Self-rating: Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Total
Interviewer rating:
Very unattractive 2 23 52 40 117
Unattractive 9 58 67 23 157
About average 39 646 870 251 1,806
Attractive 13 381 813 236 1,443
Very attractive 5 81 213 81 380
Total 68 1,189 2,015 613 3,903
Table 1.15: Sample means of interviewer-rated attractiveness by self-rated attractive-
ness
Female Male
Adolescent Adult Adolescent Adult
Rates self as:
Very attractive 3.715 3.559∗∗ 3.528 3.441∗ 3.495 3.469 3.399 3.495∗∗
(0.022) (0.053) (0.021) (0.059) (0.020) (0.049) (0.019) (0.051)
Moderately attractive 3.637 3.736∗∗∗ 3.441 3.580∗∗∗ 3.449 3.531∗∗∗ 3.348 3.478∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024)
Slightly attractive 3.688 3.692 3.541 3.449∗∗∗ 3.516 3.436∗∗ 3.469 3.295∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.035) (0.025) (0.033) (0.022) (0.033) (0.022) (0.029)
Not at all attractive 3.693 3.457∗ 3.518 3.314∗ 3.491 3.485 3.422 2.970∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.161) (0.020) (0.152) (0.018) (0.145) (0.018) (0.134)
Figures denoted by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ are significantly different from the mean of the control group at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.16: Regression estimates for the effects of adolescent and adult attractiveness
and self-rated attractiveness on (log) adult earnings
Full Sample Female Male
(N = 3903) (N = 1963) (N = 1940)
Adolescent below average −0.024 −0.024 −0.062 −0.063 0.000 0.000
(0.038) (0.038) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053)
Adolescent above average 0.042∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.055∗ 0.049∗ 0.040 0.039
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Adolescent very attractive 0.092∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.035) (0.043) (0.043)
Adult below average 0.001 0.005 0.050 0.051 −0.047 −0.045
(0.036) (0.036) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
Adult above average 0.077∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Adult very attractive 0.099∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.051)
Self-rated very attractive −0.002 −0.056 0.033
(0.027) (0.039) (0.37)
Self-rated slightly attractive −0.047∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.025
(0.021) (0.029) (0.029)
Self-rated not at all attractive −0.235∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ −0.091
(0.069) (0.095) (0.098)
Regressions include Di and Ei vectors of control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1.17: Regression estimates for the effects of adolescent and adult attractiveness
and social capital on (log) adult earnings
Full Sample Female Male
(N = 2643) (N = 1382) (N = 1261)
Adolescent below average −0.066 −0.062 −0.126∗∗ −0.128∗∗ −0.016 0.000
(0.046) (0.046) (0.061) (0.061) (0.070) (0.070)
Adolescent above average 0.031 0.028 0.020 0.019 0.060∗ 0.053
(0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Adolescent very attractive 0.049 0.051 0.034 0.036 0.101∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051) (0.051)
Adult below average 0.049 0.058 0.087 0.094∗ 0.003 0.016
(0.042) (0.042) (0.056) (0.056) (0.065) (0.064)
Adult above average 0.055∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.055∗ 0.045 0.042
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Adult very attractive 0.083∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.067 0.063 0.112∗ 0.098∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.048) (0.048) (0.060) (0.060)
Number of close friends 0.017∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
In-degree 0.003 0.000 0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Centrality 0.010 0.019 −0.001
(0.019) (0.028) (0.026)
Network density −0.042 −0.073 −0.057
(0.079) (0.114) (0.110)
Regressions include Di and Ei vectors of control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
42
Chapter 2
The economic value of fashion: effects of grooming
choices on earnings
2.1 Introduction
In the economics literature and elsewhere, the idea that an individual’s physical ap-
pearance affects labor market outcomes is abundantly evident. Surveys suggest that
when it comes to both hiring and promotion decisions, employers are influenced by
various physical attributes such as facial hair, tattoos, nontraditional haircolor, and
clothing choices. Additionally, most advice to job seekers highly emphasizes groom-
ing and personal presentation. This suggests that some relevant information is being
conveyed through the use of fashion and grooming choices and that making “correct”
choices about such matters sends an important signal to employers. Although this
idea is prevalent, it has yet to be validated except through anecdotal evidence. This
paper uses a large dataset of relatively homogeneous workers and examines the extent
to which specific dress and grooming behaviors are correlated with both labor market
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outcomes and individual measures of ability.
In this paper, I first establish that specific grooming habits are correlated with
differences in earnings and then discuss whether these differences spring from un-
observable individual characteristics that are also correlated with grooming habits
or whether they represent taste-based or stastistical discrimination on the part of
employers. Using matriculation photographs of law students along with longitudinal
career and earnings data, I estimate the effects of specific grooming practices identi-
fied in the photos and then examine how these effects change over time. Persistent
differences in earnings based on grooming categories give validity to the conclusion
that grooming behaviors are correlated with unobserved factors that influence pro-
ductivity. Changes in the coefficients of grooming behaviors across cohorts suggest
that taste-based discrimination plays a role as well. Statistical discrimination by
employers is ruled out as a source of the premium and penalty for distinct groom-
ing behaviors because these differences in earnings do not diminish over time as an
employee’s true productivity becomes evident.
Prior literature in the labor field has primarily focused on innate characteristics
and has attributed earnings differences to discriminatory behavior by employers and
consumers; hardly any empirical literature has addressed the question of fashion
as a signaling mechanism, but this concept is utilized in the theoretical literature
as an untested assumption. By focusing on aspects of appearance that are under
an individual’s control, I examine the possibility that grooming acts as a signal of
underlying human capital. Alternatively, grooming choices may serve no economic
purpose or may be a function of an individual’s identity and preferences separate
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from any utility as a labor market signaling device. This paper also examines the
economic effect of grooming in relation to the beauty effect, evaluating whether the
beauty premium is influenced by grooming choices. I find that the beauty premium is
correlated with but totally unaffected by grooming choices, implying that the observed
favoritism towards physically attractive employees is not merely a return to their
efforts to maintain a stylish appearance.
The next section briefly discusses previous literature addressing the economic im-
portance of physical appearance and fashion and section 2.3 describes the estimation
strategy involved in identifying the effects of grooming and distinguishing whether
these are due to signaling effects or correlation with unobservable factors. Section 2.4
describes the data used to address the issues at hand, and section 2.5 describes the
regression results. Section 2.6 investigates the relationship between grooming choices
and beauty ratings and establishes that these have distinct effects even though they
are correlated. Finally, section 2.7 concludes and summarizes the results.
2.2 Prior Literature
There are two relevant veins of literature addressing the economic importance of
physical appearance. The first is the idea that appearance is pertinent to earnings
and employment choices. The “beauty premium” has been well-documented using
several data sets with various occupational categories. Economists have focused on
several different aspects of appearance such as physical beauty [Hamermesh and Bid-
dle, 1994], natural haircolor[Johnston, 2010], height, or even number of missing teeth.
Investigating the impact of missing teeth, Glied and Neidell [2008] find that growing
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up in a community without flouridated water reduces a woman’s earnings by approx-
imately 4%, an effect that they attribute to employer and consumer discrimination
on an aesthetic basis. Furthermore, psychologists have found that clothing offers
important clues about personal characteristics. For example, one recent study finds
that observers can accurately judge the characteristics of an individual based only on
viewing a picture of his or her favorite pair of shoes[Gehrsitz, 2012]. Other studies
examine a myriad of personal grooming choices such as clothing [Lennon, 1990] [Brase
and Richmond, 2004], makeup [Etcoff et al., 2011], facial hair [Dixson and Vasey, 2012]
[Reed and Blunk, 1990] [Neave and Shields, 2008], and glasses [Bartolini et al., 1988],
demonstrating that perceptions of subjects’ attractiveness and personality traits are
related to each of these behaviors.
The second area of relevant research explores the use of fashion and conspicuous
consumption as economic signaling mechanisms. This literature uses economic theory
to explore the nature of changing trends; while this theoretical research is not typically
focused on a specific product or behavior but rather a generic “fashion good,” a
crucial element is the obvious visibility of the fashion in question. The general idea
is that consumers adopt distinct behaviors or products at different times in order to
interact with other desirable individuals[Pesendorfer, 1995] or to convey important
information about themselves or their status in society[Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004]
[Bartolini et al., 1988]. These fashionable displays include any number of conspicuous
products such as clothing, cars, handbags, and watches; of course, fashion cycles
also affect hairstyles and other areas of personal grooming. The analysis in this
paper is limited to the few grooming choices that are easily observable in a yearbook
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photograph of each subject, but the results may have implications for other areas of
fashionable behavior as well.
2.3 Estimation Strategy
It is clear that employers value competence and productivity as measured by tradi-
tional means such as work experience and GPA. There are two possible reasons why
they might also care about an employee’s appearance. First, aspects of an employee’s
appearance may give some indication of his unobservable characteristics that affect
competence and productivity, such as loyalty, conformity, or willingness to work hard.
The second possibility is that employers care about the appearance itself and how it
contributes to profits. Having better-looking or well-groomed employees may directly
attract or retain more clients, or it may be conducive to projecting a good image of
the company, which indirectly attracts and maintains a client base. If this is the case,
they will prefer both candidates who demonstrate high achievement as well as those
who demonstrate socially accepted external signals of professionalism and we should
see evidence of statistical discrimination on the basis of grooming chioces.
Barring statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination on the part of em-
ployers is another plausible explanation of observed correlations between grooming
and earnings. Of course, another possibility is that employers are not actually con-
cerned with employee appearance and that any differences we observe based on groom-
ing habits are a result of individual differences. This would indicate that preferences
for certain grooming behaviors are also correlated with individual preferences for cer-
tain types of jobs or other factors that affect earnings. In this case, individuals are
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self-selecting into a subgroup that indicates something about their identity that sets
them apart from their peers in statistically evident ways. For instance, we might
stereotypically assume that men with beards are more likely to prefer environmental
law over corporate tax law or that women who wear glasses are less likely to be trial
lawyers than those who do not.
Further distinguishing the cause of these differences in outcomes should focus on
determining whether these outcomes seem to be driven by career choices on the part
of employees or whether we see patterns more consistent with employer statistical dis-
crimination. Altonji and Pierret [2001] show that when firms statistically discriminate
on the basis of easily observable characteristics, the coefficients on these characteris-
tics decrease over time as more information about the employee’s true productivity
becomes known. The same is not true for taste-based employer discrimination, which
may persist over time. Additionally, if there are fundamental differences in either
preferences or ability among groups displaying different grooming choices but no
statistical employer discrimination, we should expect to see persistent differences in
outcomes between these groups.
The estimation strategy used is outlined in the equation below. If grooming choices
are used as a basis for statistical discrimination, we should see the coefficient on Gi,0
decreasing over time as employers gain more information about actual productivity.
In reality grooming is not a static characteristic, but in the data grooming is observed
only once, at t = 0, so any taste-based correlation of grooming behaviors and wages
will decrease over time as individuals move in and out of the designated groups and
the initial classification of grooming behaviors becomes increasingly noisy. Changing
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fashions may also affect taste-based discrimination, in which case the coefficients of
certain grooming behaviors may change across cohorts. If, however, the observed
effects of grooming are due to some correlation with individual fixed effects such as
unobserved productivity or personality traits, then we should see the coefficient on
Gi,0 stay the same or even increase over time.
Wit = β0 + β1Gi,0 + β2Pi + β3Ji,t + i,t (2.1)
where:
Wit = i’s yearly income at time t
Gi,0 = i’s grooming choices at time 0
Pi = a vector of personal and educational control variables
Jit = a vector of job-related control variables at time t
2.4 The Data
In order to evaluate the influence of grooming on earnings, I use a sample of lawyers
graduating from the same highly-ranked law school (hereafter referred to as Law
School X) in the 1970’s and 1980’s. In each year, between 300 and 400 students
matriculate and graduate from Law School X, and the school conducts follow-up
surveys of its students five years and fifteen years after graduation. These surveys
include questions regarding earnings directly following law school, current earnings,
job characteristics, type of law being practiced, and other demographic information.
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In addition to the survey information, the faculty member in charge of the follow-up
survey arranged to have information from the school’s records merged with the self-
reported information from the questionnaire; therefore, the data include information
gathered directly from the school’s records regarding the students’ law school per-
formance and activities. For each student, it includes GPA, class rank, law journal
and moot court participation, a composite measure of LSAT score and undergraduate
GPA, and information about the type of undergraduate institution attended.
Law School X typically publishes a book containing the photographs of the stu-
dents in each entering class. Biddle and Hamermesh [1998] were able to obtain these
photographs for several entering classes of Law School X. In total, the data contain
information for eleven separate cohorts of law students; the classes graduating in the
1970’s include the entering classes of 1969 - 1974, after which there is five-year gap in
the data, and the classes graduating in the 1980’s include the entering classes of 1979
- 1982 and 1984. The five-year follow-up survey is available for most of the students
in all cohorts, and the fifteen-year questionnaire is also available for students in the
1970’s sample years.
To measure grooming variables, data are gathered from the matriculation pho-
tographs of each student. Ideally, we could randomly choose graduating law students,
assign them to a group and dictate a set of grooming rules to follow as they go off to
their inaugural interviews and subsequent careers; this would allow for the separation
of the discriminatory and aesthetic effects of these grooming behaviors from the ef-
fects resulting from endogenous differences between the groups. Instead, we observe
the grooming choices they display in their photos, which are taken at matriculation
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for each entering class. In each photograph of a male student, it is observed whether
the student wears glasses, whether he has facial hair of any sort, and whether he is
wearing a formal jacket and button-down shirt (which in most cases is also accom-
panied by a tie). In each photograph of a female student, it is observed whether the
student wears glasses and whether she has longer than shoulder-length hair.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 contain the sample means of the control variables used, both
for the sample as a whole and by grooming category. Variables listed under Pi are
personal variables regarding law school activities and experiences prior to law school,
as well as the number of jobs held within the first five years of graduation. The
variables listed under Ji,5 are job characteristics, including years working in the private
sector as well as indicator variables for the size of the city in which the individual
currently works and number of other lawyers working in the office. Lawyers in the
different grooming categories have significantly different means for some variables,
but they do not seem to demonstrate systematic differences related to variables that
influence productivity or hireability. For instance, men with facial hair are less likely
to participate in moot court but more likely to participate in law journal, and they
show no significant differences in class rank.
This dataset is used by Biddle and Hamermesh [1998] in the context of examining
the possibility of employees switching sectors over time when the return on beauty
is greater in the private sector compared to the public sector. Since beauty is a fun-
damental component to their question, a photograph of each law student is mounted
on a separate sheet of paper and scored for attractiveness by four different raters in
order to obtain a composite score for each individual’s physical attractiveness. In this
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paper, I use an average of these four beauty ratings (recentered to have a mean of
zero and standard deviation of one) to control for inherent beauty, to compare the
magnitude of the effects of beauty and grooming, and to examine the possibility that
beauty and grooming influence one another.
While earnings data and other variables for the students are available at different
time periods, both five and fifteen years after their graduation, there is only one initial
photograph of each student. This means that there is no way to detect differences
in grooming over time and how those changes might affect outcomes of interest. I
believe it is reasonable to assume that grooming behaviors upon law school entrance
are positively correlated with the same grooming behaviors later in life; however, this
does not mean that, for instance, a man wearing a moustache when entering law school
in 1973 will necessarily continue to keep a moustache throughout his life. Over time,
people change hairstyles, clothing preferences and eyewear choices; therefore, a wage
effect for grooming behaviors might be telling us that employers have a preference for
specific behaviors, but it also may be capturing the effect of personality characteristics
such as trendiness and cultural capital that can be manifested by different grooming
behaviors in different time periods.
2.5 Results
Any investigation of these possibilties must first begin with determining whether
grooming behaviors are, in fact, correlated with any measurable employment out-
comes. To begin with, table 2.3 demonstrates the correlation between grooming and
lawyers’ first-year salaries; each grooming behavior is coded as an indicator variable
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and included in a regression of log wages along with the variables in Pi. For the men
in the sample, both glasses and facial hair are significantly correlated with lower first-
year income. For men in the 1970’s classes, wearing glasses is correlated with a 5%
decrease in income, and for men in the 1980’s classes, having facial hair of any kind is
correlated with a 7.1% decrease in income. Wearing a jacket and button-down shirt
is not predictive of a significant difference in wages, possibly because interview attire
is somewhat standard and most companies have a dress code of some kind, meaning
that clothing choices in the photos have very little to do with clothing choices in the
job market. For women in the sample, those in the 1980’s classes who wear glasses
make an average of 12.5% less than their peers. Women with long hair do not have
significantly different wages from those with short hair. Overall, the effects on glasses
and facial hair are quite large, and they outstrip the beauty premium, which Biddle
and Hamermesh [1998] find to be around 1% for each standard deviation gain in
beauty for year one of this sample.
To determine whether these correlations are a result of employer taste-based dis-
crimination, statistical discrimination, or underlying differences between the groups,
tables 2.4 and 2.5 take advantage of the longitudinal nature of these data by com-
paring the coefficients on grooming behaviors over time. Regressions on five-year and
fifteen-year wages also include relevant job-related characteristics in Ji,5 and Ji,15.
Five years after graduation, the male sample shows a continued pattern of correla-
tion between grooming and earnings. The estimated negative effect of glasses for
the 1970’s male cohort actually grows in magnitude, and the negative effect of facial
hair for the 1980’s cohort persists as well. For women, the effect of wearing glasses is
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positive for the 1970’s cohort and negative for the 1980’s cohort in year one, and both
of these effects become considerably smaller in year five. Wearing a jacket for men
and having long hair for women continue to be insignificant in determining wages in
year one and year five.
For the men in the 1970’s sample, table 2.5 shows the regression results of grooming
categories on log wages one, five, and fifteen years after their graduation from law
school. These results are somewhat ambiguous compared to the year one and year
five results, but they show that grooming categories continue to have an association
with earnings nearly two decades after the initial photographs were taken. The men
who wear glasses continue to have lower than average earnings in each time period,
although this effect is only significant in year five. The coefficient on facial hair
is negative for first-year earnings, then becomes positive for fifth-year earnings and
ends up negative again for fifteenth-year earnings. This provides strong evidence of
taste-based discrimination since this cohort’s fifteen-year follow-up falls in roughly
the same time period as the one-year and five-year earnings of the 1980’s cohort; the
coefficients on facial hair are negative and significant for each of these.
These regressions show that decisions regarding personal appearance are corre-
lated with economic outcomes. These correlations are persistent over time, even
though ostensibly grooming decisions are not. A partial explanation is that there are
unobservable differences between these self-selected groups and these differences lead
to an observable difference in income based on personal grooming choices. There is
no evidence of employer statistical discrimination; if they were to discriminate based
on a reliable signal, we would see the coefficients on grooming categories decrease
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over time as the information from an individual’s work history overshadowed the sig-
nalled information. There is evidence that employers use taste-based discrimination
and that this varies over time as different grooming behaviors are in fashion; the
strongest evidence of this is seen in changing views toward facial hair from the 1970’s
to the 1980’s.
To further explore individual differences, tables 2.6 and 2.7 compare the results
of the earnings regressions when including and excluding job-related characteristics.
Including job-related characteristics in the regressions has a modest impact on the
coefficients of the grooming variables, further evidence that grooming categories are
related to personality or other unobservable individual differences. It suggests that
part of the reason that, for instance, men in the sample with facial hair have lower
earnings is because they have different types of jobs. Grooming choices are correlated
with job characteristics, but the correlation of grooming and earnings persists even
after controlling for job characteristics.
2.6 The relationship between grooming and beauty
Table 2.8 shows that beauty ratings are significantly different from the mean for
each measured grooming behavior, and these grooming behaviors are associated with
average beauty ratings in predictable ways. Men who dress formally in their photos
are on average viewed as more attractive, while those sporting facial hair or glasses
have lower average beauty ratings. Women with long hair have higher average beauty
ratings, and those wearing glasses are generally rated lower. While these results seem
to fit stereotypical ideas of beauty in our society, it is unclear whether the grooming
55
behaviors simply affect the raters’ perception of an individual’s beauty or whether
grooming decisions are a rational response for an individual who already knows his or
her level of beauty. For instance, it may be that a less attractive woman chooses not
to focus on her appearance, instead developing other comparative advantages, and
hence she wears glasses and wears her hair short simply because it is more convenient;
a naturally more attractive woman may choose to adopt stereotypically “beautiful”
grooming habits by having long hair and wearing contact lenses. Since we do not
observe changes in physical appearance over time, it is impossible to separate the
“true” level of physical beauty from the observed beauty that may be impacted by
grooming behaviors.
Whatever the cause of the correlation between beauty and grooming, it is worth-
while to recognize that the differences in beauty means by grooming category are
rather large, with some of the categories showing a difference of almost one standard
deviation. In order to ascertain whether the beauty premium is affected by groom-
ing (and vice versa), I examine the effects of grooming and beauty on log earnings,
both separately and simultaneously. If the observed effects of grooming behaviors are
simply a natural result of their correlation with beauty ratings, then including the
variable for physical attractiveness should eliminate any observed effects of grooming.
On the other hand, if the beauty premium is mostly a result of individuals’ personal
grooming efforts, including measures of objective grooming behaviors should lessen
the effects of these subjective beauty ratings.
Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 show regression results for log earnings using beauty
and grooming variables as independent variables. The strongest correlations between
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income and grooming occur in the first year after law school, while the correlations
between income and beauty grow in magnitude over time. As seen in table 2.9, groom-
ing has very little impact on the beauty premium for first-year wages. Additionally,
beauty has very little impact on the return to most of the grooming behaviors. For
men in the 1980’s classes, part of the penalty for facial hair appears to be due to its
negative correlation with beauty, but men with facial hair have average earnings that
are 6.6% less than their clean-shaven cohorts even after controlling for beauty. For
women in the 1970’s classes, there appears to be a premium for wearing glasses which
is in conflict with the beauty premium because of the apparent correlation between
glasses and homeliness. When including both glasses and beauty, the coefficients for
each increase significantly. For women in the 1980’s classes, the opposite seems to be
true; there is a penalty for wearing glasses, and this works in the same direction as
the beauty premium since women with glasses have lower beauty ratings. Including
both variables slightly decreases the effect of each, although glasses are still negatively
correlated with first-year earnings for women in this cohort.
The results on fifth-year earnings, shown in table 2.10 are largely similar to the
results on first-year earnings. By the fifth year, the beauty premium is fully evident
for the men in the sample, and it becomes more obvious that grooming behaviors
do not affect the return to beauty in any meaningful way. The seeming increase in
the penalty for men who wear glasses in the 1970’s cohorts turns out to be a result
of the negative correlation between glasses and beauty. After controlling for beauty,
the magnitude of the glasses penalty in year five is similar to is magnitude in year
one. Similarly, a small part of the effect of facial hair is also due to its negative
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correlation with beauty. The grooming behaviors for women are not significantly
correlated with wages at year five, but the effect of beauty on grooming and vice
versa is similarly seen on a smaller scale. This underscores the conclusion that long
hair is not significantly correlated with earnings in any way; including beauty in the
regressions greatly reduces the coefficient of long hair, implying that any correlation
of long hair and earnings is through the association of long hair with increased beauty.
Table 2.11 shows the coefficients on beauty and grooming for the men graduat-
ing in the 1970’s for whom earnings data are available for three different points in
time. Here it is most apparent that beauty plays an increasingly important role in
determining earnings as one’s career progresses over time. The beauty premium is
unobservable in the first-year income, and by the fifteenth year each standard de-
viation in beauty commands a wage premium of 5.7%. The interactions of beauty
and grooming are more complicated for this cohort of lawyers, mostly because the
coefficients on grooming do not follow any obvious pattern over time. Part of the
observed penalty for wearing glasses in years five and fifteen appears to be due to the
negative correlation between glasses and beauty along with the increasing importance
of beauty. It also appears that men who are dressed formally in their photos may
actually receive lower compensation in later years, but that this effect is mitigated by
the fact that these men were rated as being more physically appealing. When control-
ling for both beauty and grooming, wearing a jacket becomes significantly negatively
correlated with year five income; the same effect is seen to a lesser extent in year
fifteen although it is not statistically significant.
These results comparing the effects of beauty and grooming are similar to the re-
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sults in Chapter 1. In both sets of data, some grooming categories are associated with
average beauty ratings that significantly differ from the sample mean, but grooming
and beauty are separately correlated with earnings. In the data used in Chapter
1, there is some evidence that higher body mass index and wearing glasses have a
negative effect on a person’s perceived beauty, but the beauty premium is unchanged
by the addition of grooming variables. Likewise, several grooming categories are as-
sociated with significant differences in average wages, but these correlations are not
affected by the addition of beauty variables. Results from both data sets confirm
that the beauty premium is separate from and generally not affected by grooming
behaviors, and vice versa.
2.7 Conclusion
I find that some personal grooming choices demonstrated in photographs of law stu-
dents are correlated with later earnings and that these differences in earnings are
somewhat persistent over time. In the first year after law school, men who wear
glasses in the 1970’s cohort earn an average of 5% less than their classmates, and
men in the 1980’s cohorts who have facial hair earn 7.1% less than their classmates.
Women graduating in the 1980’s who wear glasses have earnings that are 12.5% less
than those of their peers. No effects are found for either men who are dressed in
suit jackets or women who have long hair in their photographs. Similar grooming
effects for the males in the sample are also seen in earnings five years after law school
graduation, although grooming effects for women wearing glasses decrease in mag-
nitude. For the men in the sample for whom data are available at one, five, and
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fifteen years, the coefficients on the three grooming behaviors do not show a cohesive
pattern, although there are significant correlations between grooming and income at
different points in the careers of this cohort. It is interesting that the same grooming
behavior can have different effects in each of the two decades; this implies that either
there are different personality traits associated with these behaviors in different time
periods or that employer preferences for these behaviors change over time (perhaps
as fashions change).
Each grooming behavior in the data is correlated with beauty ratings that are
significantly different from the mean, although causality cannot be determined. How-
ever, the earnings premium for beauty is robust to the inclusion of grooming behav-
iors, indicating that grooming choices are not a major cause of the beauty premium.
The coefficients on grooming behaviors are somewhat impacted by the inclusion of
beauty in the regressions, suggesting that part of the effect of grooming choices on
earnings may be due to the correlation of grooming and physical attractiveness. In
the case of women in the 1970’s cohort who wear glasses, beauty and grooming effects
work in opposite directions since women who wear glasses have higher income but
also tend to have lower beauty ratings; when both are included in the regressions,
the effect of each one is strengthened. Overall, this shows that beauty and grooming
have separate effects on earnings.
I conclude that the grooming habits studied do not serve an important job mar-
ket signaling function for this group in terms of statistical discrimination. Although
grooming is found to have significant correlation with earnings, these correlations
generally stay the same over time. This is inconsistent with the stastical discrimina-
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tion hypothesis, which would suggest that the effects of the discrimination categories
decrease over time. It appears that fashion is related to identity and preferences of
workers and taste-based discrimination of employers, but that it is not being utilized
as a mechanism for stastistical discrimination in the job market for lawyers.
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Table 2.1: Sample means of control variables by grooming category (men)
Variable Full sample Glasses Facial hair Jacket
P1
White 0.931 0.952∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.944∗
(0.254) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008)
Undergrad in-state 0.332 0.364∗∗ 0.359∗ 0.335
(0.471) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017)
Undergrad Ivy League 0.138 0.110∗∗ 0.142 0.113∗∗∗
(0.345) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011)
Undergrad other private school 0.317 0.316 0.277∗∗ 0.315
(0.465) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016)
Years of prior work experience 1.203 1.491∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗ 1.329∗∗
(2.538) (0.146) (0.128) (0.102)
Master’s degree 0.071 0.084∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.256) (0.013) (0.016) (0.009)
Doctorate 0.031 0.048∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.174) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006)
Moot court 0.119 0.126 0.097∗∗ 0.128∗
(0.324) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Law journal v143 0.230 0.223 0.262∗∗ 0.227
(0.421) (0.019) (0.022) (0.015)
Finish early 0.065 0.069 0.081 0.090∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010)
Finish late 0.184 0.173 0.183 0.174
(0.387) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013)
Class rank 175.202 175.430 175.326 179.080
(107.799) (4.804) (5.703) (3.822)
Judicial clerkship 0.117 0.121 0.152∗∗∗ 0.114
(0.322) (0.015) (0.018) (0.011)
First job private sector 0.793 0.768 0.751∗∗ 0.768∗
(0.405) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015)
Number of jobs 1.811 1.820 1.834 1.747∗∗
(0.883) (0.044) (0.045) (0.031)
J5
Years in private sector 3.674 3.634 3.552 3.616
(1.934) (0.094) (0.104) (0.071)
City population 200,000 - 1 million 0.304 0.306 0.284∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(0.460) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017)
City population 1 - 3 million 0.316 0.297 0.346 0.306
(0.465) (0.021) (0.024) (0.016)
City population over 3 million 0.158 0.117∗∗ 0.125 0.082∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010)
150 + other lawyers in office 0.302 0.242∗∗∗ 0.290 0.268∗∗
(0.459) (0.021) (0.024) (0.016)
50 - 149 other lawyers in office 0.236 0.237 0.221 0.251
(0.425) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016)
16 - 49 other lawyers in office 0.228 0.244 0.221 0.250∗
(0.420) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016)
Other variables
Currently married 0.651 0.675 0.707∗∗∗ 0.676∗
(0.477) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022)
Age 31.484 32.012∗∗∗ 32.076∗∗∗ 31.755∗∗
(2.869) (0.205) (0.154) (0.167)
Currently lawyer 0.936 0.939 0.936 0.946
(0.244) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
Hours per week (80’s classes only) 52.743 51.861∗ 53.064 52.821
(8.562) (0.707) (0.667) (0.579)
Figures denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significantly different from the mean of the control
group at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Sample means of control variables by grooming category (women)
variable Full sample Glasses Long hair
P1
White 0.889 0.860 0.937∗
(0.314) (0.050) (0.078)
Undergrad in-state 0.382 0.440 0.413
(0.486) (0.071) (0.036)
Undergrad Ivy League 0.142 0.160 0.143
(0.349) (0.052) (0.026)
Undergrad other private school 0.311 0.260 0.286
(0.463) (0.063) (0.033)
Years of prior work experience 1.828 2.740∗ 1.566∗∗
(3.332) (0.623) (0.234)
Master’s degree 0.091 0.100 0.074
(0.288) (0.043) (0.019)
Doctorate 0.019 0.040 0.011∗∗
(0.138) (0.028) (0.103)
Moot court 0.137 0.100 0.164
(0.344) (0.043) (0.027)
Law journal 0.240 0.300 0.212
(0.428) (0.065) (0.030)
Finish early 0.044 0.080 0.058
(0.205) (0.039) (0.017)
Finish late 0.226 0.220 0.180∗∗
(0.419) (0.418) (0.028)
Class rank 190.458 172.900 184.500
(108.910) (16.959) (7.648)
Judicial clerkship 0.172 0.160 0.143
(0.378) (0.052) (0.026)
First job private sector 0.726 0.640 0.693
(0.446) (0.069) (0.034)
Number of jobs 1.963 2.100 1.836∗∗
(0.913) (0.149) (0.062)
J5
Years in private sector 3.081 2.818 2.961
(2.035) (0.319) (0.164)
City population 200,000 - 1 million 0.241 0.292 0.247
(0.428) (0.066) (0.033)
City population 1 - 3 million 0.338 0.396 0.312∗
(0.473) (0.071) (0.036)
City population over 3 million 0.225 0.125∗∗ 0.194
(0.418) (0.048) (0.030)
150 + other lawyers in office 0.323 0.317 0.382∗∗
(0.468) (0.074) (0.040)
50 - 149 other lawyers in office 0.183 0.146 0.163
(0.387) (0.056) (0.026)
16 - 49 other lawyers in office 0.179 0.220 0.151∗∗
(0.384) (0.065) (0.029)
Other variables
Currently married 0.567 0.565 0.607
(0.496) (0.074) (0.038)
Age 32.051 33.191∗∗ 31.665∗∗
(3.722) (0.694) (0.265)
Currently lawyer 0.862 0.837 0.848
(0.345) (0.053) (0.027)
Hours per week (80’s classes only) 49.556 49.667 49.613
(10.093) (1.970) (0.909)
Figures denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significantly different from the mean of
the control group at the 1%, 5%,and 10% levels, respectively. Standard deviations
are in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Coefficients of grooming variables on first-year wages
All classes 1970’s classes 1980’s classes
Men (N = 1608) (N = 855) (N = 753)
Glasses −0.032∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.008
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027)
Facial hair −0.047∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.071∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.027)
Jacket 0.007 0.013 −0.002
(0.017) (0.022) (0.025)
Women (N = 407) (N = 116) (N = 291)
Glasses −0.024 0.146 −0.125∗∗
(0.055) (0.112) (0.063)
Long hair −0.013 −0.007 −0.004
(0.034) (0.089) (0.035)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
Table 2.4: Correlation of grooming and earnings in years 1 and 5
All classes 1970’s classes 1980’s classes
W1 W5 W1 W5 W1 W5
Men (N = 1515) (N = 816) (N = 699)
Glasses −0.018 −0.051∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.088∗∗∗ −0.002 0.011
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.028) (0.034)
Facial hair −0.037∗∗ −0.024 −0.022 0.004 −0.056∗∗ −0.057∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.031) (0.028) (0.033)
Jacket 0.007 −0.020 0.004 −0.025 0.004 −0.012
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
Women (N = 349) (N = 98) (N = 251)
Glasses 0.034 0.006 0.192 0.069 −0.064 −0.006
(0.058) (0.069) (0.132) (0.129) (0.066) (0.087)
Long hair −0.006 0.045 0.057 0.076 −0.008 0.027
(0.036) (0.043) (0.106) (0.104) (0.037) (0.049)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Correlation of grooming and earnings in years 1, 5, and 15 for men in
1970’s classes
Men (N = 658) W1 W5 W15
Glasses −0.022 −0.054∗∗ −0.041
(0.023) (0.025) (0.043)
Facial hair −0.032 0.030 −0.082∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.050)
Jacket 0.011 −0.040 −0.005
(0.023) (0.025) (0.043)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Table 2.6: Correlation of grooming and earnings in year 5 with and without job
characteristics
All classes 1970’s classes 1980’s classes
J5 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Men (N = 1566) (N = 850) (N = 716)
Glasses −0.051∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ 0.019 0.011
(0.022) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.037) (0.033)
Facial hair −0.043∗ −0.033 −0.011 0.003 −0.081∗∗ −0.071∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.032) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033)
Jacket −0.022 −0.013 −0.016 −0.020 −0.033 −0.008
(0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.031)
Women (N = 367) (N = 102) (N = 265)
Glasses −0.002 0.006 0.045 0.048 −0.046 −0.011
(0.073) (0.064) (0.131) (0.120) (0.091) (0.079)
Long hair 0.022 0.028 −0.064 0.055 0.050 0.011
(0.047) (0.042) (0.104) (0.100) (0.055) (0.048)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
65
Table 2.7: Correlation of grooming and earnings in year 15 for men in 1970’s classes
with and without job characteristics (N = 699)
J15 No Yes
Glasses −0.083∗ −0.045
(0.047) (0.042)
Facial hair −0.124∗∗ −0.086∗
(0.056) (0.049)
Jacket −0.001 0.004
(0.048) (0.042)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Table 2.8: Sample means of beauty ratings by grooming category
Full Sample 1970’s classes 1980’s classes
Men
Glasses 2.996 2.531∗∗∗ 2.982 2.446∗∗∗ 3.009 2.665∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.022) (0.041)
Facial hair 2.911 2.737∗∗∗ 2.862 2.665∗∗∗ 2.969 2.816∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035) (0.024) (0.035)
Jacket 2.780 2.965∗∗∗ 2.664 2.913∗∗∗ 2.859 3.077∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034)
Women
Glasses 3.134 2.575∗∗∗ 3.167 2.487∗∗∗ 3.123 2.629∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.078) (0.057) (0.133) (0.036) (0.096)
Long hair 2.980 3.185∗∗∗ 2.917 3.194∗∗∗ 3.009 3.168∗∗
(0.040) (0.046) (0.094) (0.071) (0.048) (0.066)
Figures denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significantly different from the mean of the
control group at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
66
Table 2.9: Regression results of beauty and grooming variables on first-year wages
All classes 1970’s classes 1980’s classes
Men (N = 1608) (N = 855) (N = 753)
Beauty 0.020∗∗ 0.014 0.012 0.001 0.029∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Glasses −0.032∗ −0.022 −0.050∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.008 0.007
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028)
Facial hair −0.047∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.022 −0.022 −0.071∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
Jacket 0.007 0.003 0.013 0.013 −0.002 −0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Women (N = 407) (N = 116) (N = 291)
Beauty 0.017 0.018 0.028 0.060 0.025 0.018
(0.017) (0.018) (0.042) (0.046) (0.017) (0.018)
Glasses −0.024 −0.006 0.146 0.205∗ −0.125∗∗ −0.107∗
(0.055) (0.058) (0.112) (0.121) (0.063) (0.066)
Long hair −0.013 −0.018 −0.007 −0.027 −0.004 −0.010
(0.034) (0.035) (0.089) (0.090) (0.035) (0.036)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Table 2.10: Regression results of beauty and grooming variables on fifth-year wages
All classes 1970’s classes 1980’s classes
Men (N = 1566) (N = 850) (N = 716)
Beauty 0.035∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.032∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
Glasses −0.047∗∗ −0.023 −0.081∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗ 0.011 0.027
(0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034)
Facial hair −0.033 −0.025 −0.003 0.004 −0.071∗∗ −0.064∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033)
Jacket −0.013 −0.023 −0.020 −0.031 −0.008 −0.016
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031)
Women (N = 367) (N = 102) (N = 265)
Beauty 0.038∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.047 0.066 0.031 0.018
(0.019) (0.021) (0.045) (0.054) (0.022) (0.023)
Glasses −0.002 0.038 0.048 0.119 −0.011 0.018
(0.064) (0.067) (0.120) (0.133) (0.079) (0.081)
Long hair 0.028 0.016 0.055 0.017 0.011 0.002
(0.042) (0.042) (0.100) (0.104) (0.048) (0.048)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: Correlation of beauty, grooming and earnings in years 1, 5, and 15 for
men in 1970’s classes
Men (N = 658) W1 W5 W15
Beauty 0.005 −0.001 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.023)
Glasses −0.022 −0.023 −0.054∗∗ −0.023 −0.041 0.009
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.043) (0.047)
Facial hair −0.032 −0.032 0.030 0.039 −0.082∗ −0.067
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.050) (0.050)
Jacket 0.011 0.011 −0.040 −0.054∗∗ −0.005 −0.028
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.043) (0.044)
Coefficients denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Chapter 3
Copyright couture: Should designers have
intellectual property rights for their creations?
3.1 Introduction
In this age of myriad product choices and extensive branding, consumers purchase
goods not only for their material value but also for their symbolic value; aside from
practical uses, possessions have social meanings attached to them as well. “It seems an
inescapable fact of modern life that we learn, define, and remind ourselves of who we
are by our possessions” [Bartolini et al., 1988, p. 160]. When buying positional goods,
part of what a consumer is purchasing is a sense of cachet or style that transcends
the strict utilitarian value of an item. Of course, firms try to magnify the appeal of
this intangible characteristic by devoting resources to building up the image of their
products; in fact, it has even been suggested that producers and advertisers create
the demand for status goods by embuing products with social and psychological
properties. [Galbraith, 1958] [Mason, 2000] Part of what makes these types of goods
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interesting is that the social meaning of an item can change over time based on societal
perceptions and the groups of consumers currently using the product. Demand for
products is constantly shifting as different trends come to the forefront and consumers
try to stay abreast of which goods are socially desirable.
This turnover in which certain items are currently “fashionable” results in cycles
of new products being released, sold to some or all of the population, then falling out
of favor as still newer versions are released. For example, the retail clothing industry
exhibits continual fashion cycles wherein consumers adopt new styles of clothing even
though their older clothing is still fully functional. “Clothing is clearly the classic
product of fashion-oriented behavior, but fashion also touches consumers’ aesthetic
choices ranging from autos and housing to foods and music. Indeed fashion-oriented
behavior has even been identified with intellectual pursuits of science, literature, arts,
and education” [Sproles, 1981, p. 116]. Hence, though this analysis is centered on
the example of retail clothing, it can be applied to a range of other goods as well,
particularly those that are positional or socially visible products.
Firms employ the strategy of making superficial updates to a product’s design or
appearance that are nearly irrelevant to its functionality but that, nonetheless, entice
consumers to replace their current “unfashionable” product with the newest model.
A characteristic associated with this phenomenon is that fashionable products are
copied by firms other than the one originating the design. In contrast to most other
types of intellectual property, a designer does not have well-defined property rights
over clothing and other extrinsic design innovations under U.S. law. Limited legal
protection is available for certain types of trademarks and design innovations, but
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the process of obtaining a patent is quite lengthy and would likely take longer than
the duration of the item’s popularity [Scafidi, 2008]. Perhaps because of this lack
of intellectual property protection, it is common to see “knockoffs” of conspicuously
fashionable goods such as purses, wallets, and watches.
Purportedly, designers encourage (or at least condone) this sort of imitation in
order to speed up the rate at which their designs become obsolete. Unhindered by
intellectual property law, rampant design imitation supposedly increases the speed
at which innovation takes place while simultaneously increasing designers’ profits.
“More fashion goods are consumed in a low-IP world than would be consumed in
a world of high IP protection precisely because copying rapidly reduces the status
premium conveyed by new apparel and accessory designs, leading status-seekers to
renew the hunt for the next new thing” [Raustiala and Sprigman, 2006, p. 48]. It has
even been suggested that copying is endemic to the success of and “a core activity”
of the fashion industry [Hilton et al., 2004, p. 4].
Although some believe that imitation benefits designers, the fact that designers
themselves fight against it provides evidence to the contrary. Since 2006, a series of
bills have been introduced in the United States Senate that would provide increased
intellectual property protection to apparel designs. The latest version of this bill,
the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, is endorsed by both the
Council of Fashion Designers of America and the American Apparel and Footwear
Association, who claim that imitations are harmful to the industry as a whole and
to individual designers whose fashions are copied and sold for lower prices than the
designers themselves charge.
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In this paper, I examine the two conflicting viewpoints on the merits of imitation.
In short, does the presence of an imitator cause designers to make greater profits than
they would if no imitation were allowed, and how does imitation affect consumers and
total surplus? To answer these questions, I build on a model of fashion cycles put
forward by Pesendorfer [1995]. His model lends itself well to the study of design
imitation; in it, fashion cycles arise from designers’ profit-maximizing behavior and
from consumers’ use of fashion as a tool for social screening. The role of fashionable
products in facilitating social matching leads to a cycle wherein a designer period-
ically releases new designs which gradually disseminate throughout the population,
beginning with “high” types and moving on to “low” types. When a design has dis-
seminated through enough of the population that its value decreases below a sufficient
level, the designer creates a new fashion (with a corresponding higher price) that can
then be used as an effective signaling device for the high types. The cycle repeats,
and each newly innovated fashion eventually loses value as a means of matching as
the designer lowers the price and sells to low types, necessitating the conception of
yet another style that can be sold at a premium price and used by high types to
match with one another. Note that the fashion good is more valuable to a consumer
the longer it remains “in style” and is still viable as a matching signal.
Building on Pesendorfer’s model, this paper expands the framework to include
a potential imitator. The designer periodically releases new styles and a string of
potential imitators can choose to enter the market and copy each original design. In
this environment, there exist equilibria in which the designer and an imitator both
produce each design, in which only the designer produces, and in which no design is
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produced; for each of these equilibria, there exists an equilibrium of the imitator-free
game in which the designer earns greater profits. Consumer welfare is highest in the
equilibrium in which no design is produced, and the imitator always earns zero profits
in equilibrium. These results demonstrate that extending legal protections to fashion
and other external design elements would be beneficial to designers and possibly to
consumers.
3.2 The Model
An important assumption of this model is that people associate with others who wear
the same type of clothing or who use the same status-signalling products. Part of
the purpose of fashion goods is to signal one’s quality or other unobservable traits
in order to associate with desirable people, presumably those with high levels of
human or social capital. If high types derive more utility from mixing with other
high types and low types derive more utility from mixing with other low types, then
fashion does not command a premium price. Both groups adopt their own norms and
signaling habits in order to interact with members of their own group. This can be
seen in the case of certain subcultures with very distinct styles of dress and grooming;
their fashions, though distinctive, are not expensive or commercially mass-produced
because the fashions have little value to those outside the subculture. On the other
hand, if certain fashions are adopted by groups that many people desire to emulate
or interact with, designers make positive profits and we see fashion cycles occurring.
Creators of fashion goods have authority to coordinate demand for their designs,
whether through advertising, reputation, or luck; that is, the items they produce
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are widely accepted as signals of quality along some desirable dimension of human
capital. The process by which this authority is gained will be left to further research,
and I will simply assume that there is a single designer whose designs facilitate a
matching process. I also include the possibility of entry into the market in the form
of a string of “copycat” designers. These short-lived players act consecutively and,
lacking the means to coordinate demand themselves, can exercise the option to imitate
the original designer’s goods. The designer can innovate new styles for a fixed cost
cd, while the imitator only has the option to copy an existing design for a fixed cost
ci = 0. The imitators cannot solve the consumer coordination game, perhaps due
to lack of advertising budget, insufficient reputation, or the expense and ingenuity
involved in creating entirely new designs, but they can copy any existing design at
zero cost. This captures the idea that entry into the market is difficult for a designer
who must solve the coordination game, but very easy for the imitators, who face low
costs and few barriers to entry. Since the changes being made are only superficial
design changes instead of fundamental advances in technology, an imitator can easily
copy the design at a negligible cost after the designer has borne the cost of creating
the design idea and communicating the change to consumers. Once the fixed cost of
innovating a design has been paid, additional units can be produced at zero marginal
cost by both the designer and imitator.
I assume that consumers either cannot or choose not to distinguish between the
two products and that both serve the same matching function. Higgins and Rubin,
studying the counterfeiting of trademarked goods, explain that “consumers do not
really care if the product is counterfeit as long as it appears genuine to an outside
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observer” [Higgins and Rubin, 1986, p. 212]. The purpose of an external design or
trademark is to show that its consumers are part of a certain group; therefore, any
imitation which will allow the consumer to join the “in” group falls into the same
category as the original design. I assume that consumers are indifferent about who
produces the good; what matters is that it remains a valid signal in the coordination
game. The copied goods can take the form of direct, illegal counterfeits or simply
designs that are inspired by or reminiscent of the original design. In fact, designers
themselves often copy their own successful designs through collaborations with de-
partment stores or having multiple brands under the same parent company [Hilton
et al., 2004]. The identity and affiliation of the imitator is not taken into account in
the model, although the issue of whether the designer and imitator are affiliated could
have important implications for the designer’s willingness to condone the imitation.
There is a unit measure of consumers, of whom α are high types and 1 − α are
low types. For a generic consumer q, if q ≤ α, q is a high type, and if q > α, q is a
low type. This could be any dimension of personal characteristics or human capital
that is believed to be signalled via status goods. Consumers engage in a matching,
or “dating” game wherein each is randomly matched with another consumer who
uses the same design. This could represent an array of social situations as well
as labor applications such as job interviews or business pairings. For example, a
homeowner matches with a realtor who drives the same type of expensive car. Utility
is based on the quality of a match rather than on the design directly, capturing
the idea that the main purpose of positional goods is to increase prestige and social
capital. Each type of consumer receives higher utility from matching with a high
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type; however, high types place a larger premium on having a high match. That is,
u(h, h)−u(h, `) > u(`, h)−u(`, `). Each consumer has quasi-linear utility such that a
consumer of a type i matched with a consumer of type j spending m units of money
on a design receives total utility u(i, j)−m. Thus, using a design is only useful insofar
as it increases the probability to a consumer of matching with a high type.
Consumers cannot distinguish the designer’s product from the imitator’s product;
however, they are aware of the most current design. The designer creates a sequence
of fashionable designs, n ∈ 1, 2, .... Assume that design n is only innovated after
designs 1, ..., n − 1 have already been created. Consumers can use only one design
at a time, and all consumers observe the design used by each individual. The design
can hence be representative of any category of status goods that precludes multiple
designs being used at once; for example, it could represent an individual’s choice of
car, clothing, or mobile phone. An individual may choose to use no design, which
will be denoted as choosing design n = 0. Define µi(n) as the fraction of consumers
of type i ∈ h, ` who are currently using design n. The following conditions apply to
the matching technology:
(i) If µ`(n) + µh(n) > 0, for n = 0, 1, ..., then a consumer who uses n meets a high
type with probability µh(n)/ [µh(n) + µ`(n)]
(ii) If µ`(0) + µh(0) = 0, then a consumer who uses no design (n = 0) meets a low
type with probability 1.
(iii) If µ`(n)+µh(n) = 0, then a consumer who uses design n meets a high type with
the same probability as a consumer who uses no design (n = 0).
76
Suppose the designer has the ability to coordinate demand for the latest good and
that all consumers have the same endowment of “old” designs 1, ..., n − 1. Demand
for fashion occurs when a consumer has a higher probability of meeting a high type
when using the latest fashion rather than an out-of-date item. Thus, consumer i’s
single-period willingness to pay for fashion n is given by the difference in utility
from matching with a high type instead of a low type multiplied by the increase
in probability of meeting a high type by using the fashion in that period. Suppose
consumers [0, q) are using design n.
If the marginal consumer q is a high type, he will certainly be matched with a
high type by using the design. If he chooses not to use the design, he will remain
in the pool of consumers [q, 1] which are not using the design, and will be matched
with a high type with probability (α − q)/(1− q). Thus, the value to consumer q of
design n is vh
(
1− α−q
1−q
)
= vh
(
1−α
1−q
)
, where vh ≡ u(h, h)− u(h, `). He will purchase
the design if the price is less than or equal to the value of the design. All consumers
q′ < q also find it profitable to purchase and use the latest design.
If the marginal consumer q is a low type, then the choice is either to purchase the
design and be in a pool of consumers of whom α/q are high types or to not purchase
the design and match with a low type with probability 1. Thus the value of the latest
fashion is v`
α
q
, where v` ≡ u(`, h)− u(`, `).
This willingness to pay can be captured in a function that is dependent on the
quantity of the good in the market in any period. The signalling value of the fash-
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ionable good is given by:
f(q) =

1−α
1−q vh if 0 ≤ q ≤ α
α
q
v` if 1 ≥ q > α
This function gives the value to a consumer q of consuming the fashionable design
in a period for which consumers [0, q] are using the design and consumers (q, 1] are
not. It increases until the point where q = α, then decreases as low types enter the
“fashionable” group. The signalling value of the fashion reaches its maximum when
the groups are perfectly divided; high types purchasing the design can be guaranteed
a match with another high type, and low types do not purchase the design and are
matched with other low types. From the standpoint of efficiency in matching, it would
be ideal to always have perfect separation of types in this manner; however, this may
not occur given the incentives of the designer and imitator. Setting an optimal price
would be quite straightforward if it were a singular occurrence, but to analyze fashion
cycles it is necessary to describe behavior in more than one period.
If possible, the designer would prefer to innovate only once, selling the item to only
high types for a price equal to their willingness to pay to match with other high types
forever. There are two main reasons why this does not constitute an equilibrium.
First of all, in reality most goods are not perfectly durable and need to be replaced
periodically. The second reason, which is of more importance to this model, is that the
single-innovation strategy is not incentive compatible for the designer or the imitator.
Having sold the design to all the high types, the designer and imitator would want to
further capitalize on the fashionable design by selling it at a lower price to low types
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in future periods. Even if the designer were to seek to elongate the fashion cycle and
build a reputation for less frequent design changes, the imitator would certainly have
an incentive to reap the rewards of selling to the lower social capital consumers. Over
time, each design loses value as it is sold to more and more consumers. In the words
of Simmel [1904, p. 138], “As fashion spreads, it eventually goes to its doom”.
The timing of the model is as follows:
(i) At the beginning of a period, the designer chooses whether to produce a new
style or continue selling an older style and what price to charge. The imitator
simultaneously chooses whether to copy the latest existing design and what price
to charge.
(ii) After the designer and imitator have made their decisions, consumers then
choose which design to purchase and use. A consumer can only use one de-
sign at a time.
(iii) At the end of each period, each consumer is matched with another and derives
utility based on the type of individual to whom he is matched. I follow Pe-
sendorfer’s matching technology; that is, each consumer is randomly matched
with another who uses the same design. Consumers who use no design are
matched to a low type with probability 1.
At the start of a period, the current design has been sold to q ∈ [0, 1] fraction of
consumers. The designer and imitator each choose whether to enter the market at all
(through innovation for the designer or through imitation for the imitator), as well
as a price level in each period, denoted by pm,t, for m = i, d. The prevailing price in
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a period is given by pt = min {pd,t, pi,t}, and whichever charges the lower price sells
to all the consumers whose willingness to pay is greater than or equal to the price
charged. If both charge the same price, I assume that consumers choose to buy from
the original designer because they have a slight preference for the original design.
This tiebreaking rule does not affect equilibrium results.
The designer has the following payoff:
Ri(0) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1[ptqd,t − cd(ηt)] (3.1)
Here, ηt = 1 for periods in which the designer innovates and zero otherwise. In
the first period after an innovation, the designer creates a new fashion and is the only
supplier in the market; thus, she chooses the price for this period. For periods in
which an innovation does not occur and an imitator is present, the price the designer
obtains for her designs is dependent on both her own choice of price and the imitator’s
choice of price.
When yt = 0, an innovation has occurred in that period and the imitator has not
yet had time to copy the currently fashionable design; therefore, the imitator’s output
qt,i and profit in this period are equal to 0. One can think of the period length as
being the length of time necessary for the imitator to be able to copy a design and
the designer to be able to create a new design. A longer period corresponds with a
lower δ, while a shorter period length corresponds with a higher δ. Since the imitator
does not last longer than one fashion cycle, his value of production is just the sum of
revenues in each period minus the cost of imitation:
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Ri(0) =
T∑
t=1
δt−1ptqi,t − ci (3.2)
He will imitate if the revenue stream from imitation is larger than the cost of
imitation. Here, T is the number of periods for which the design stays popular. Note
that in any period in which the designer and imitator are producing, the equilibrium
price must be zero. If not, either could increase profits by slightly lowering its price
and selling to all the consumers. Also note that there is an endless stream of potential
imitators, so even if the designer were able to reach a collusive agreement with one
imitator to charge a nonzero price, another would have an incentive to enter the
market and undercut this price.
3.3 Results
I consider subgame perfect equilibria that satisfy:
(i) Consumers who do not already own the current design nt make their decision
of whether or not to purchase nt only on the basis of its current price. Thus,
consumer demand for nt can be characterized as an acceptance function P (·)
such that consumer q will purchase the design if and only if pt ≥ P (q).
(ii) All previously innovated designs n < nt have an equilibrium price of zero. For
design nt, the realized demand in any period is determined by the optimal
behavior of consumers.
I follow Pesendorfer in referring to such equilibria as weak Markov coordination
(WMC) equilibria.
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Theorem 1. If cd ≤ max {αf(α), f(1)}, there exists a pure-strategy WMC equilib-
rium in which the designer innovates in each period and the imitator copies each
design in the period after an innovation if the designer does not sell to all consumers.
For such an equilibrium,
(i) Consumers are worse off than if no fashion existed.
(ii) There exists an equilibrium of the monopoly designer game in which the designer
earns (weakly) higher profits.
(iii) Total welfare in this equilibrium is lower than it would be without imitation.
(iv) The imitator never produces the currently fashionable good.
(v) The equilibrium is unique if αf(α)− cd > (1− α)f(1) or if αf(α) < f(1).
In this equilibrium, the designer sells to either all the high types (if αf(α) > f(1))
or all consumers (if αf(α) ≤ f(1)); if the imitator observes that the designer sells to
q′ < 1 consumers, he will imitate the design, enter the market in the next period, and
sell to the remaining consumers. This constitutes an equilibrium from the designer’s
perspective because she will not earn any additional revenue by allowing the design
to stay popular for more than one period. Knowing the imitator will enter in the next
period and that price competition will drive the price of the design to zero, she chooses
to maximize single-period revenue and innovate in the next period. The imitator is
indifferent between entering and not entering, so he enters and sells the most recent
unfashionable design (nt−1) to all of the remaining consumers in the period in which
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the designer sells the most recent fashionable design nt to either all of the high types
or all of the consumers.
For part (i), note that without the existence of a fashion good, each consumer is
matched with a high type with probability α and a low type with probability 1− α.
Each high type receives expected utility of αu(h, h)+(1−α)u(h, `) = αvh+u(h, `), and
each low type receives expected utility αu(`, h)+(1−α)u(`, `) = αv`+u(`, `). Under
the equilibrium described in theorem 1, when the newly innovated design is sold only
to high types, each high type receives expected utility of u(h, h) − vh = u(h, `) and
each low type receives expected utility of u(`, `). When the newly innovated design
is sold to all consumers, they match with a high type with the same probability as
they do when no fashion exists but have to pay the price of the design; high types
receive expected utility αvh + u(h, `) − αv` and low types receive expected utility
αv` + u(`, `) − αv` = u(`, `). In either case, both types of consumer are worse off in
this equilibrium than they would be if no design were available.
Part (ii) is true because the designer has the option to innovate each period even
when there is no possibility of imitation; any other equilibrium of the monopoly
designer game must then result in at least the same profit level or else the monopolist
would simply choose to innovate in each period.
For part (iii), note that the designer is worse off with imitation and the imitator
earns zero profits in equilibrium. Then to show that total welfare is higher without
imitation, all that remains is to consider consumer welfare. For the equilibrium in
which the designer sells only to high types in each period (when αf(α) ≥ f(1)),
consumers are worse off than they are in any equilibrium without an imitator. In
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fact, consumers in this equilibrium already have the lowest possible utility; both high
and low types receive the utility they would receive from being matched with a low
type, which they can always get by using no design. Therefore, any equilibrium must
give them (weakly) higher utility or else they would choose the outside option to not
use a design. For the equilibrium in which the designer sells to the entire market in
each period (when αf(α) ≤ f(1)), low types receive the utility they would receive
from matching with a low type, so they are at least as well off in any other equilibrium.
For high types, they receive a random match from the total population and pay a
price equal to αv`, ending up with total expected utility u(h, `) +α(vh− v`). In other
equilibria, high types may pay a higher price, but their willingness to pay increases
only with the increase in expected quality of a match. Although high types may be
charged a higher price in an imitator-free equilibrium, the designer correspondingly
earns higher profits as match efficiency is increased, so overall welfare is at least as
large in any equilibrium without an imitator.
Part (iv) is true because the imitator does not have time to copy the currently
fashionable good before it goes out of style. Instead, he produces each design the
period after it is popular, selling to all the low types for a price of 0.
Part (v) follows from the fact that once the designer has sold to all the high
types in the first period, she receives higher profits by immediately innovating again
than by selling to the low types. Likewise, if it is more profitable to sell to all
of the consumers instead of only the high types, the designer will innovate each
period in order to maximize profits; any other equilibrium would yield strictly lower
profits. If this condition is not met, the designer may randomize between innovating
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and not innovating in the second period after an innovation. Such a mixed-strategy
equilibrium is explored in theorem 3.
Theorem 2. If cd > max {αf(α), f(1)}, there exists a unique WMC equilibrium in
which no design is produced.
If cd > max {αf(α), f(1)}, the designer can only earn positive profits if the design
is popular for more than one period. However, if the imitator observes an innovation,
he knows the designer will charge a positive price in more than one period, so he will
enter the market with probability one in the period after an innovation, driving the
price down to zero. This would lead to negative profits for the designer, so she never
innovates.
Unlike in the monopoly designer case, an equilibrium does not guarantee an infinite
stream of innovations. Pesendorfer describes an environment in which fashion cycles
inevitably arise in the existence of a status signalling good, but in the presence of
imitation this is not necessarily the case. Interestingly, although the imitator does
not actively produce the current design in the equilibria described in theorems 1 and
2, his potential presence still has an effect on the equilibrium behavior of the designer.
Under certain conditions, the possibility of imitation ensures that no design will be
created and therefore no signals are introduced into the consumer matching game.
Theorem 2 refutes the idea that piracy encourages more innovation in status goods
markets and sets forth conditions under which no design can be profitably produced.
If the cost of desigining an original good is higher than the revenue earned by selling
to all the high types or to all consumers in one period, then the designer can never
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recoup all of her costs, and thus it is never optimal to create a design. In this case,
imitation prevents the production of a socially desirable good.
Theorems 1 and 2 show that there is no condition in which the designer is better
off in the presence of an imitator. They consider equilibria of the game in which only
the designer produces the currently popular good. In reality we sometimes observe
imitation of fashion goods; it could be the case that this imitation only occurs after
an item is no longer an acceptable signal as in Theorem 1, but it is also possible
that imitation occurs while a design is still popular. In order to consider equilibria in
which both the designer and imitator are actively producing the fashion good, I focus
on a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the designer randomizes between innovating
and not innovating in the second period after a new design is introduced.
Theorem 3. If cd ≤ αf(α), αf(α) − cd ≤ (1 − α)f(1), and αf(α) ≥ f(1), there
exists a mixed-strategy WMC equilibrium in which the designer randomizes between
innovating and not innovating in the second period after a new design is introduced
and the imitator randomizes between entering and not entering in the period after a
new design is introduced. For such an equilibrium:
(i) Consumers are better off than they are in the pure-strategy equilibrium described
by theorem 1 but worse off than they would be if no fashion existed.
(ii) There exists an equilibrium of the monopoly designer game in which the designer
earns (weakly) larger profits.
In this equilibrium, the designer sells to all high types in the first period after an
innovation and then either innovates in the next period or sells to the low types in
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the second period after an innovation. If she does not sell to all the high types in
the period after an innovation, the imitator knows that the designer will definitely
charge a positive price in the next period and will enter with probability one. If
αf(α) < f(1), the designer would simply sell to the entire market in each period, and
if αf(α)−cd > (1−α)f(1), it is always more profitable for the designer to immediately
innovate again than to allow the design to remain popular for another period. In order
for the designer to be indifferent between innovating again immediately and allowing
the design to be popular for one more period, she must earn the same amount of profit
for each action. Denote v0 = αp0− cd + qδv0 + (1− q)δv1 as the continuation value of
innovating in the next period and v1 = (1−p)(1−α)p1 +δv0 as the continuation value
of allowing the design to remain popular for another period, where p is the probability
that the imitator enters the market and q is the probability that the designer innovates
immediately in the next period following an innovation. The designer charges a price
p0 = f(α) + δ(1 − p)(1 − q)f(1) in the period in which she innovates, capturing the
fact that high types will pay the expected value of the match in both that period and
the potential match if the design remains popular for another period (the maximum
value of the design in the period after an innovation is f(1) since that is the prevailing
price when the designer sells to all the low types). In the period after an innovation,
the designer charges a price p1 = f(1) if the imitator does not enter the market and 0
otherwise. Setting v0 = v1 yields (1− p) = αf(α)−cdf(1)[(1−α)−αδ(1−q)] ; p is between 0 and 1 for
q ≥ 1− (1−α)
αδ
and q ≥ 1+αf(α)−cd−(1−α)f(1)
αδf(1)
(the first is always satisfied when the second
is satisfied), which implies that if αf(α) − cd ≤ (1 − α)f(1), there exist a range of
possible equilibria in which q ∈ [1+ αf(α)−cd−(1−αf(1))
αδf(1)
, 1] and p = 1− αf(α)−cd
f(1)[(1−α)−αδ(1−q)] .
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The imitator is indifferent between entering and not entering since he earns zero
profits in either case, but equilibrium behavior requires that he mix between the two
instead of always entering as in the equilibrium described in theorem 1. This could
correspond to a situation of imperfect enforcement of intellectual property law in
which an imitator would like to enter the market in each period but is forced to desist
with probability (1− p). In this case, p is exogenous and q is chosen by the designer
so as to maximize v0. Another justification for this type of equilibrium is that in
actuality, the cost of imitation is nonzero so imitators must earn positive profits in
at least some periods. Suppose that there is some small cost of imitation ci > 0 and
that marginal costs are also nonzero for the imitator and designer. If we assume that
MCd = MCi + , then the resulting price in each period is equal to MCd, netting an
expected positive profit for the imitator in some periods, which justifies the cost of
imitating some designs.
Part (i) is true because, under the equilibrium described in theorem 1, each high
type receives expected utility of u(h, h)−vh = u(h, `) and each low type receives utility
of u(`, `); in this mixed-strategy equilibrium, low types receive the same expected
utility for periods in which a new design is innovated but a higher utility in periods
in which a design remains popular for a second period (utility for these periods is
u(`, `) when only the designer is in the market and αu(`, h) + (1 − α)u(`, `) when
the designer and imitator produce); high types receive expected utility of u(h, `)
for periods in which an innovation takes place, αu(h, h) + (1 − α)u(h, `) − v` for
periods in which a design remains popular for a second period and only the designer
produces, and αu(h, h)+(1−α)u(h, `) for periods in which the designer and imitator
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produce a popular design. However, both types are still better off with no fashion
than in this equilibrium; with no fashion, each high type receives expected utility of
αu(h, h) + (1− α)u(h, `) = αvh + u(h, `), and each low type receives expected utility
αu(`, h) + (1 − α)u(`, `) = αv` + u(`, `), and these are weakly higher than utility in
any period of the equilibrium described in theorem 3.
Part (ii) is true because the continuation values with a monopoly designer are the
special case of this equilibrium in which p = 0 and q = 1; since v0 is decreasing in p,
the designer’s profits are greater without an imitator than in any equilibrium of this
type in which p > 0.
These results show a variety of effects on designers. Imitation unequivocally has
a negative effect on designers and gives them an incentive to innovate more often
than they otherwise might. This is especially interesting given the recent technology
advances that allow imitators to more quickly and easily copy popular designs. It in-
dicates that imitation is likely to become increasingly harmful to designers as the cost
of imitation decreases.1 Ever-shortening supply chains are allowing fashion imitators
to surreptitiously produce copies of popular runway designs in a very short amount of
time. In the model, the interpretation of this behavior is that imitators would rather
shorten the periods so as to enter the market and make profits. However, this means
that the designer is less likely to be able to recoup the initial investment of creating
a design, leading to less innovation overall as imitation becomes easier.
1“Today, a pattern can be based upon an Internet broadcast of the runway show and transmitted
electronically to a low cost contract manufacturer overseas. A gradual easing in import quotas,
begun in 1995, has increased scale and thereby lowered overseas manufacturing costs. Electronic
communications and express shipping ensure that prototypes and finished articles can be brought
to market quickly. As a result, thousands of inexpensive copies of a new design can be produced,
from start to finish, in six weeks or less.” [Hemphill and Suk, 2009a, p. 124]
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature on status goods and fashion cycles and specifically
addresses the issue of whether design goods should have intellectual property protec-
tion. It uses a model in which consumers engage in social matching by using status
goods produced by a single designer and copied by a string of (potential) imitators.
Some literature has suggested that design imitation leads to more innovation, higher
profits for designers, and shorter fashion cycles. These results show that design imi-
tation may indeed lead to more frequent innovation and shorter fashion cycles if the
cost of designing a good is low enough, but that this increased innovation does not
benefit designers or consumers; in the equilibrium in which a new design is created
every period, total welfare is lower than in any equilibrium that occurs in the ab-
sence of imitation. In the three types of equilibria explored, the designer’s profits are
lower than they would be in an equilibrium with no imitation; additionally, consumer
welfare is higher when no fashion is produced than it is when the designer and im-
itator are in the market together. Of the three types of equilibria, the best one for
consumers is the one in which no fashion is created.
I show that if the cost of designing a good is high enough, then no design will
be produced in equilibrium. Under these circumstances, the possibility of imitation
makes it so that there is no way for a designer to profitably produce a fashion good, so
innovation is thwarted entirely. Under other conditions, the designer alone produces
each current status good or the designer and imitator both produce. The imitator
always earns zero profits in equilibrium.
Together, these results lead to the conclusion that design imitation is not in-
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nocuous from the designer’s standpoint and that designers have a credible claim on
protection for their designs. This is particularly true when the cost of originating a
design is very high; in this situation a lack of design protection means that no innova-
tion will take place, which is in direct contrast to the monopoly designer situation in
which infinite innovations occur. Contrary to some claims, I do not find any evidence
that design imitation is ever beneficial for the designer.
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